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I. INTRODUCTION

In an episode of Seinfeld, Jerry was confronted with the requirement
of taking a polygraph test after denying, to a woman police-officer whom
he was dating, that he watched the television show Melrose Place.2 Deeply
concerned about his pending polygraph examination, he turned to George
Costanza, his friend who Jerry felt had the unique ability to deceive a lie
detector.' After George counseled Jerry as to the difficulty of deception,
Jerry was ready to leave for the test, resigned to his fate.4 Then George
offered these final words of advice: "Jerry, just remember, it's not a lie if
you believe it."'5 Although that episode of Seinfeld was simply attempting
to entertain us by showing one particular character's attitude toward the
truth, what we as a society find humorous very often reflects society's
underlying attitude.
The example from Seinfeld illustrates American society's growing view
that in many cases the ends justify the means, even if that involves creative
interpretations of the truth. Regardless of whether one is a supporter or
opponent of former President Bill Clinton, most would agree that the low

1. See Seinfeld Summary, http-/www.tv.corn/seinfeld/show/1 12/summary.htnl& fulLsummary=l
("This is a show about nothing; however, for a show about nothing, this show has many complex
plots, sub-plots, is very well written and put together. So much so that until the public caught onto
the series, the television critics were responsible for helping to keep it alive. The critics further went
on and made the series victorious in every category it was eligible for in the 1st Annual American
Television Awards. Seinfeld has also won a few Emmy Awards, the George Foster Peabody Award
for 1992 and many more.") (last visited Jan. 2006).
2. Seinfeld: The Beard (NBC television broadcast, Feb. 9, 1995).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
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point of his presidency was when, during testimony via videotape before
a federal grand jury, he quibbled over the meanings of the words "sex" and
"alone," and, alas, when he answered one question with the response of
"that depends on what your definition of 'is' is."6 While many supporters
made the legitimate argument that Clinton's private personal conduct
should not be considered an impeachable offense, Clinton took the
position that he had done nothing wrong because his answers were "legally
accurate." 7 The near uniform support among fellow Democrats 8 and the
President's maintenance of strong approval ratings from the public9
demonstrated that society's attitude was that the end results justify creative
interpretation of facts and occurrences to fit the desired ends.
Many, including the IRS, have argued that corporations and wealthy
individual taxpayers should not have the ability to use "loopholes" in the
tax law to reduce their tax liability in ways "unintended" by Congress.10
They argue that it is unethical for accountants and tax attorneys to design
or create transactions that have no economic effect and simply generate
"paper" losses, expenses, or credits with the purpose of reducing a client's
tax liability." Frequently in the case of corporate taxpayers, courts and
commentators use phrases such as "no business purpose" when they
describe these transactions. 2 What they fail to consider is that from the

6. The Office of Independent Counsel, Referral to the United States House of
Representatives (Sept. 9, 1998), availableat http://judiciary.house.gov/Legacy/2toc.htm.
7. Id.
8. James Bennet, Impeachment: The President-ClintonImpeached; PresidentDigs In,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1998, at Al.
9. Adam Nagourney, Impeachment: The Polls;PublicSupport For The President,And For
Closure, Emerges Unshaken, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1998, at A23.
10. Throughout this Note, the references to loopholes and the intent of Congress will be
contained inside quotation marks. This is because I have significant problems with the widespread
use of these terms. What is meant by congressional intent? Is it the thoughts of the lawyer on the
committee staff who drafted the language? The thoughts of the lobbyist who influenced him to
include certain provisions? Certainly it cannot be the thoughts of the members of Congress
themselves. I would be willing to place a large wager that if it were a requirement for a member
of Congress to have read the bill in order to be allowed to vote on it, no tax legislation would
muster a quorum. The tax laws passed by Congress are just collections of words, usually brought
together with "syntactical correctness." See Learned Hand, Thomas WalterSwan, 57 YALEL.J. 167,
169 (1947). As discussed at length throughout this Note, some of the words are vague and
subjective, necessarily relying on courts to determine the economic substance oftransactions. Other
Code sections contain language with bright-line rules and precise language. In the latter situation,
there is no need to consider intent. When the words are clear, the intent is what is meant by the
plain meaning of the words. The language used throughout the Internal Revenue Code often creates
exceptions to clear-cut rules where the drafters desired. If a section contains a clear-cut rule without
an exception, then there is no exception to that rule.
11. See generallySheldon D. Pollack & Jay A. Soled, Tax ProfessionalsBehaving Badly, 105
TAX NoTES 201 (2004) (arguing that greed has led tax professionals to push improper tax shelters).
12. See ACM P'ship v. Comm'r, 157 F.3d 231, 252-54 (discussing the requirement that
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perspective of the corporation, income taxes are an expense, no different
than wages, rent, or interest. When a corporate officer chooses to engage
in a transaction where the company can reduce an expense by incurring
transaction costs far less than the amount saved, that decision is not based
on anything learned in an MBA program. It is just plain common sense.
Often corporations and the wealthy are easy targets for complaints
about tax "loopholes." Politicians are able to score points with voters by
expressing outrage at the corporations and wealthy individuals that
"abuse" the laws that the politicians wrote by following the rules in a way
that decreases their tax liability. When budget deficits are continuing to
increase and the public desires for government spending to increase at the
same time, corporations become easy targets for what some view as an
abuse of the tax system. Since the enactment of the income tax in 1913,
courts have used a variety of substance over form rules to restrict the
ability of corporations and individuals to "shelter" income. 13 Now some
members of Congress want to make these judicially created doctrines part
of the tax code itself. 4 These proposals, along with the judiciallydeveloped doctrines, essentially would allow the government to say,
regarding the tax code, that the existing rules do not apply when the IRS
and some sympathetic judges do not like the "smell"" of what the taxpayer
is trying to achieve.
This is not a Note about politics or ethics. This is a Note about tax law
and the tax consequences of highly complex, real transactions entered
into by corporations and wealthy individuals in an effort to reduce
their income taxes. 16 But the overall attitude society has regarding

transactions have a business purpose apart from taxes).
13. See infra Part ll.
14. Allen Kenney, Korb Speculates On Codification Of Economic Substance Doctrine, 105
TAX NoTEs 932 (2004) (discussing the codification of the economic substance doctrine part of the
Senate version of the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004; the provision was not part of the final
version of the bill).
15. See ACM P'ship v. Comm'r, 157 F.3d 231,265 (3d. Cir. 1998) (McKee, J., dissenting).
In a case further discussed in Part IV.A, the majority held that despite meeting all the technical
requirements of the law, the taxpayers were not entitled to the tax treatment under the law because
the transactions lacked economic substance or were a sham. Id. at 245-48. Judge McKee dissented
and stated that disallowing gains and losses that clearly met the realization requirements of the
statute, I.R.C. § 1001 (2000), amounted to the court applying a "smell test" and disallowing the
losses because the taxpayer was attempting to "pull the wool over [the Commissioner's] eyes." Id.
at 265.
16. In many instances the corporation will be forced to argue in court that there are some
actual substantive economic effects from these transactions in order to have the transactions
respected for tax purposes. This does not mean that these transactions were designed and created
for any purpose other than reduction of one's tax liability. It only means that the transactions in
some way impact the economic positions of the parties to the transaction. For taxpayers or their
attorneys to argue that there was a profit motive behind these transactions aside from favorable tax
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playing games with the truth and reality affects the perception of how far
tax practitioners can go in aggressively structuring (or, more cynically,
creating) transactions solely for their "unintended" tax consequences.17
The line between aggressive, yet permissible, tax planning and improper,
and sometimes criminal, tax evasion, like many lines in the law, is not at
all clear or even straight. There are often things far away from that line
that are unquestionably permissible or undoubtedly illegal." The problems
come in the cases that fall closest to the line. In those instances, honest and
honorable professionals can disagree about the correct result that comes

implications would take real chutzpah.
17. Many of the articles that condemn tax shelters and the lawyers and accountants who
devise them discuss how tax professionals should not seek out technical anomalies in the interaction
of various Code sections to create transactions that would never have occurred absent the tax
consequences. See generally Pollack & Soled, supra note 11, at 203-04 (arguing that, motivated
by prospects of extremely high fees, tax professionals act improperly by pushing improper tax
avoidance techniques). It is interesting that the people who attribute the problems with corporate
tax shelters to unethical tax lawyers advocate a system with fewer clear rules that relies more on
subjective determinations made by the very lawyers and accountants whose ethical shortcomings
created the problem with the bright-line rules. I am not arguing that it is a good thing that we, as
a society, accept, in large part, finding ways around rules. I am, however, realistic about the nature
of people. "If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men,
neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary." THE FEDERALIST NO.
51 (James Madison). The bright-line rules are necessary to prevent endless litigation and subjective
characterization of transactions by taxpayers. To paraphrase what Donald Rumsfeld would probably
say: You write the tax law for the world you have, not the world you would want or wish to have.
Cf. William Kristol, The Defense Secretary We Have, WASH. POST, Dec. 15, 2004, at A33.
18. The IRS puts out a list of tax scams that are frequently peddled by scam artists. These
claims, which any tax professional would regard as frivolous, include the following: "[T]hat the
Sixteenth Amendment concerning congressional power to lay and collect income taxes was never
ratified; that wages are not income; that filing a return and paying taxes are merely voluntary; and
that being required to file Form 1040 violates the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination
or the Fourth Amendment right to privacy." See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., IRS ANNOUNCES THE
2005 DIRTY DOZEN (Feb. 28, 2005), available at http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/O,,
id=136337,00.html. Certain tax minimization techniques, however, are widely used and perfectly
acceptable. For example, individual taxpayers who use the cash method of accounting often pay
two years of state property tax in one year to allow themselves to aggregate their itemized
deductions into one year so it will exceed the standard deduction. Additionally, there are always
some tax strategies that are just plain humorous for tax professionals who spend their lives reading
the Internal Revenue Code. For example, a taxpayer inquired about claiming a casualty loss
deduction when the funeral home lost his deceased wife's ashes, and the now famous case of the
stripper, who after being denied a deduction for breast implants as a medical expense, was allowed
to deduct the cost of the surgery as an unreimbursed business expense. See Leslie Haggin Geary,
Most Absurd Tax Claims: From Breast Implants To CrematedAshes, Taxpayers Try Anything To
Score New Deductions, CNNMoney.com, Jan. 20, 2003, http://money.cnn.com/2003/01/29/pf/
taxes/q-absurdmoves/. My questions to the court in the case are: Shouldn't breast implants be
considered capital expenditures with a useful life exceeding one year and therefore be capitalized
and depreciated? And, would the stripper be required to allocate the cost between the business use
and personal use in computing the allowable deduction?
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from applying the rules embodied in the Internal Revenue Code and
Treasury Regulations, which often contain a combination of objective
rules and subjective standards.
In this Note, I will argue that the economic substance doctrine is
unnecessary as either ajudicially created common law standard or as a part
of the Internal Revenue Code. I will show how many tax law provisions
depend on a court determining the economic substance of transactions to
apply the plain meaning of the statute. In the instances raised by certain
recent cases, where the Code and Regulations clearly allow taxpayers
benefits that were not contemplated by Congress or the IRS when the
provisions were enacted, it is the place of Congress and the IRS, not the
courts, to close the "loopholes."
Abandoning the economic substance doctrine would not allow
taxpayers to characterize their transactions in whatever way they choose.
The characterization would still be governed by applying the facts and
circumstances of a transaction to the statute. It would, however, prevent
the government from changing the rules after the game has been played.
I am not arguing that economic substance has no role to play in tax law.
Nor am I arguing that the current version of the Internal Revenue Code
strikes the proper balance between subjective standards and objective
rules. In a tax system that is a mixture of standards and bright line rules,
there will always be situations where substance governs and other where
form governs; and it will always be true that substance "controls over
form, except, of course, in those cases in which form controls."19 My
argument in this Note is that the plain language of the statutes enacted by
Congress, not the opinion of judges on what the correct rule should be,
determines whether the substance or form of a transaction controls its tax
treatment. All taxpayers should be able to rely on the rules that are written
to plan, and even create, transactions with predictable tax consequences.
A corporation does not forfeit its right to due process simply because it is
profitable and large enough to make it cost effective to hire bright tax
advisors to devise ways within the system of laws enacted by Congress to
reduce the corporation's tax liability.
Part II of this Note briefly discusses the complex nature of the tax law
and how many transactions that are labeled tax shelters rely on the tax
treatment the IRS sought for nonrecourse debt. Part In traces the
development of the economic substance doctrine. Parts IV & V look at
recent cases decided by the courts under the economic substance doctrine

19. Martin J. McMahon, Jr., Business Purpose,Economic Substance, and CorporateTax
Shelters: Random Thoughts On Applying JudicialDoctrines To InterpretThe Internal Revenue
Code, 54 SMU L. REv. 195, 195 (2001) (stating that "[t]his immutable law of federal taxation lies
at the heart of the ongoing controversy about the proper role of several long-standing judicial
doctrines for interpreting and applying the Internal Revenue Code").
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(the inconsistent results demonstrate Judge McKee was correct in stating
that the courts apply the economic substance doctrine as a "smell test" 20 ).
Part VI examines the shelter that was part of the recent scandal involving
KPMG's tax practice and describes how the shelter fails to deliver the
claimed tax result even without any consideration of the economic
substance doctrine. Part VII argues that changing the rules after the game
is played is inappropriate and that many tax rules depend on ascertaining
the economic substance of transactions to properly apply the law;
therefore, the economic substance doctrine is either inappropriate or
redundant.
I. TAX COMPLEXITY: THE GOVERNMENT'S ARGUMENT FOR
SUBSTANCE OVER FORM IS SIMILAR TO THE CHILD WHO MURDERS HIS
PARENTS AND PLEADS FOR LENIENCY BECAUSE HE IS AN ORPHAN

A. Governments That Live in Glass Houses Shouldn't
Throw Stones
The Internal Revenue Code 21 consists of the rules enacted by Congress,
pursuant to its authority to tax income under the Sixteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution.22 In certain instances, Congress has granted
the Treasury Department the power to enforce certain provisions by
promulgating regulations to guide how the Code is to be implemented.23
Together the Code and Treasury Regulations promulgated pursuant to
specific Code provisions make up the enacted rules that govern the
computation and imposition of federal income taxes.
Complexity in the tax code is far from a novelty. 24 The complexity in
20. See supra note 15.
21. I.R.C. §§ 1-9833 (2005).
22. U.S. CONST. amend XVI ("The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on
incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and
without regard to any census or enumeration.").
23. I.R.C. § 7805(a) (2000). See, e.g., I.R.C. § 79(c) (2000) ("For purposes of this section and
section 6052, the cost of group-term insurance on the life of an employee provided during any
period shall be determined on the basis of uniform premiums (computed on the basis of 5-year age
brackets) prescribedby regulations by the Secretary.") (emphasis added). The IRS also issues
interpretive regulations that are not pursuant to any specific Code provision. These regulations
contain the interpretation of the IRS of a particular Code provision.
24. In 1947, Second Circuit Judge Learned Hand explained his view of the tax law by stating:
[T]he words of [the Internal Revenue Code] merely dance before my eyes in a
meaningless procession: cross-reference to cross-reference, exception upon
exception-couched in abstract terms that offer no handle to seize hold of-leave
in my mind only a confused sense of some vitally important, but successfully
concealed purport, which it is my duty to extract, but which is within my power,
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the tax law can be attributed to many different causes. Some of the
complexity is the result, as Judge Hand stated, of Congress attempting to
close loopholes.25 Other areas of complexity are the result of poor
drafting 26 or attempting to put mathematical formulas into words.2 ' The
other cause of complexity in the tax law is the reality that the economic
and financial world is complex. The concept of income is not as simple as
the Sixteenth Amendment would have you believe. Some degree of
complexity is necessary in the rules to fairly and consistently compute a
measure of income in a world with complex corporate ownership
structures, global corporations with trading partners on nearly every
28
continent, and numerous financial instruments with differing forms.
The complex nature of the laws that determine the amount people are
if at all, only after the most inordinate expenditure of time. I know that these
monsters are the result of fabulous industry and ingenuity, plugging up this hole
and casting out that net, against all possible evasion; yet at times I cannot help
recalling a saying of William James about certain passages of Hegel: that they
were no doubt written with a passion of rationality; but that one cannot help
wondering whether to the reader they have any significance save that the words
are strung together with syntactical correctness.
Hand, supra note 10, at 169.
25. Id. For examples of loophole-closing provisions, see I.R.C. § l(h)(1l)(B)(iii) (2004)
(preventing "dividend arbitrage" opportunities that are created by taxing dividends at lower rates
than short-term capital gains), I.R.C. § 183 (2000) (limiting deductions on hobby activities that are
"not engaged in for profit" and creating a presumption of when profit motive exists), I.R.C. § 267
(2004) (disallowing deduction from and loss recognition on transactions involving related
taxpayers), and I.R.C. § 469 (2004) (limiting the use of losses from passive activities in which the
taxpayer does not materially participate to only being allowed to offset income from other passive
activities and defining rental activities to be passive).
26. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1T(c)(A-18) (1984) ("T'he second situation is where the
payments are to be reduced on two or more occasions which occur not more than one year before
or after a different child of the payor spouse attains a certain age between the ages of 18 and 24,
inclusive. The certain age referred to in the preceding sentence must be the same for each such
child, but need not be a whole number of years.").
27. See, e.g., I.R.C. § l(h)(1)(B) (2004).
28. Just as the tax authorities have been debating the economic substance doctrine, the
accounting profession has been debating moving from "rule-based" accounting standards to
"principle-based" accounting standards. The argument for moving to "principle-based" standards
is similar to the argument for applying the economic substance doctrine: "Rule-based" standards
lead to structuring transactions to get the desired treatment in a way that obfuscates the true intent
of the rule. The counter-argument is similar to the argument against the economic substance
doctrine: The uncertainty surrounding the treatment of transactions would chill productive behavior
and create reported results based on individuals' (in the case of the economic substance doctrine,
courts') subjective interpretation of the transaction. For a detailed report on the "principle-based"
standard issue, see SEC. AND EXCH. COMM'N, STUDY PURSUANT TO SECTION 108(D) OF THE
SARBANES-OxLEY ACT OF 2002 ON THE ADOPTION BY THE UNITED STATES FINANCIAL REPORTING
SYSTEM

OF

A

PRINCIPLES-BASED

ACCOUNTING

http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/principlesbasedstand.htm.
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required to pay in taxes creates numerous opportunities for tax
professionals, who have, as Judge Hand stated, expended "inordinate
[amounts] of time" studying tax law to structure transactions in a tax
efficient way. 29 Few people, if any, would say structuring business
transactions in a tax efficient way is improper.3" The complexity and the
bright-line objective tests inherent in the tax law, the increasing
complexity in the features allowed in financial instruments and business
organizations, and the expansion of a globally interdependent economy
have allowed tax planners to devise transactions to exploit that complexity
and interdependence in ways that manufacture a tax loss without a true
economic loss.3 1
29. Hand, supra note 10, at 169.
30. For example, government officials, academics, and professionals generally agree where
one party wants to "sell" his current property and "reinvest" the proceeds in a new investment
property, it is acceptable to use an intermediary to structure the real estate transaction when the
other party does not want to exchange properties, but wants to sell for cash. A tax professional,
David Hariton, who has written numerous articles on the economic substance doctrine, justifies the
use of otherwise economically meaningless straw men in these types of situations because, as he
argues, if the tax-advantaged way of carrying out the transaction were not available, what would
be left is not a more direct transaction, but no transaction at all. David P. Hariton, Sorting Out The
Tangle of Economic Substance, 52 TAX LAW. 235, 236 (1999) ("Finally, a more complex, taxadvantaged way of executing a transaction should not lack economic substance if the transaction
itself has economic substance").
31. Even though Hariton acknowledges, "[a]fter all, form, not substance, determines tax
liabilities under a realization-based income tax," Hariton goes on to argue:
It is precisely because of our commitment to this relatively objective system that
we are loathe to overturn the "technical" results which arise from the application
of complex rules to complex business transactions. The taxpayer, we believe, is
entitled to rely on the rules and the answers to which those rules give rise. She
should not be denied beneficial tax results which she stumbles upon, or even seeks
out, in the course of her legitimate business dealings, even if those results are
obviously unanticipated, unintended or downright undesirable.
Nevertheless, given that it is the taxpayer, not the Commissioner, who chooses
the form of the relevant business transactions, there must be at least some limits
on the taxpayer's ability to enter into transactions which give rise to tax benefits
under the rules as they currently exist-otherwise the fisc is not likely to collect
very much tax on capital. No agency can foresee, let alone draft, rules to govern
coherently every conceivable permutation of facts and circumstances in an
increasingly complex business world. The consequences of our failure to maintain
such limits, therefore, will be: (1) an increasingly defensive set of
rules-niggardly, complex and narrow of spirit--designed with a view to potential
abusers, real and imagined; (2) an increasingly inequitable allocation of tax
liabilities, with relative benefits inuring to bigger taxpayers that are able and
willing to enter into costly tax-motivated transactions; and (3) primarily as a result
of (2), an erosion of confidence in what is functionally a self-enforced honor
system of determining tax liabilities.
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B. Be Careful What You Wish For
If many of the complex rules that afford tax planners the opportunities
to create beneficial tax consequences devoid of economic impact are the
result of implementation of rules designed to prevent abusive transactions
from vague and subjective rules, then it cannot be appropriate to ignore the
objective rule when the government subjectively views it as being abused.
In fact, in many instances, tax shelters rely on a position advocated by the
government a long time ago. Over time, changes in economic conditions
and thoughtful reflection by tax lawyers and accountants turned the
government's apparent victory in Crane v. Commissioner32 into a sword
that allowed taxpayers to create tax losses with no real economic loss.
Beulah Crane inherited an apartment building from her late husband in
1932. 33 At the time she inherited the building, it was encumbered by a
mortgage in an amount approximately equal to the value of the building.34
She entered into an agreement with the bank whereby she would continue
to manage and rent out the apartments and remit the net rental proceeds
(after expenses) to the bank without assuming the debt of her late
husband. Over the period that she continued to operate the apartment
building, she reported the rent received as gross income and deducted
expenses for interest, taxes, and depreciation of the building.36 The amount
of the net rentals was not sufficient to cover the interest charges on the
outstanding balance and over time the amount of interest in arrears on the
loan grew to over $15,000. 37 With the bank threatening to foreclose on the

was willing to pay her $2,500 for the
property, Crane found a buyer who
38
mortgage.
the
to
subject
property
Crane argued that because at the time she inherited the property the
amount of the mortgage was equal to the value of the property, she
inherited equity in the building of zero that had a zero basis to her.39 She
claimed to have sold that equity for $2,500 and realized a gain of $2,500. 40
Id. at 235, 237.
32. 331 U.S. 1 (1947).
33. Id. at 3.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 3-4. Crane agreed to a sales price of $3,000, but agreed to pay $500 of transaction
costs, so she received $2,500. Id. The buyer did not assume the mortgage, but took the property
subject to the mortgage. Id.
39. ld. Crane did, however, take depreciation deductions during the time she managed the
building. This is inconsistent with her position that she had a zero basis when she inherited the
property. Id. at 3 n.2.
40. Id. at 3-4.
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The Commissioner argued that Crane realized an amount equal to the
amount of actual cash she received plus the amount of debt the property
was subject to and had a basis in the property of its fair market value at the
time of her husband's death decreased by depreciation allowed as
deductions to her.41 The Court, in what many tax lawyers believe is the
most important tax case ever decided, agreed with the government and
held that the amount realized on a sale of property includes relief from
debt even if the seller was not personally liable for the debt. 2
Although not explicitly stated in the case, the rule in Crane created a
corollary that purchasers of property who use nonrecourse debt to purchase
the property receive a basis that includes the amount of debt used in the
purchase. This implicit rule from Crane was stated explicitly in Parkerv.
Delaney.43 This rule, allowing taxpayers to receive a full cost basis for
property acquired using nonrecourse debt, was responsible for many of the
tax shelter activities in the early 1980s, and it often plays some role in the
corporate tax shelter controversies of today. Obtaining a basis for assets
purchased solely from the use of nonrecourse debt provides an opportunity
for taxpayers to use that basis to create losses without any risk of an
economic loss because the taxpayers are not individually responsible for
paying back the debt. 44 In certain types of transactions, the creditor can

41. Id. at 4-5.
42. Id. at 13-15.
43. 186 F.2d 455, 457 (1st Cir. 1950). Note the wording of the court:
During the years of his operation of them he took deductions for depreciation on
a cost basis equal to the amount of the first mortgage liens. In this court he
expressly disclaims any contention that [the buildings'] value for depreciation
purposes was less than those liens. These mortgages represented the prices paid,
or the consideration, for the properties. The properties became subject to these
liens and appellant considered them as the cost in deducting depreciation. Nothing
appears to the contrary and we must, as did the court below, accept these figures
of cost used by appellant. Indeed we do not understand him to dispute this
treatment of the cost question.
Id.
44. In the early 1980s, there was a growing use of partnerships to create tax losses by
purchasing assets at inflated prices using nonrecourse debt. This is what in large part led to the
downfall of the savings and loan industry which made many of these nonrecourse loans. The
partnerships would purchase assets at inflated prices using nonrecourse financing. The assets would
generate depreciation deductions that exceeded the profits of renting out or other use of the property
and created net losses to the partnership. The losses would then be passed through to the individual
partners and used to offset other sources of income. Eventually the taxpayer would walk away from
the project and fail to report the gain that should have been recognized when the lender took over
the property because the partnership could not meet its payment obligations. For a discussion of
this, see Pollack & Soled, supra note 11, at 202 & n.7 (citing Bernard Wolfman, The Supreme
Court in the Lyon's Den: A Failureof JudicialProcess,66 CoRNE.L L. REv. 1075 (1981); Daniel
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also be assured of no economic loss because the creditor is also the seller
of the property subject to the debt.45
The problem inherent with giving basis for assets purchased with
nonrecourse debt, while apparent to some, did not become fully
ascertained until the Supreme Court was confronted with the situation
where the amount of the nonrecourse liability exceeded the market value
of the property, the issue the Court declined to address in Crane.46 The
Supreme Court was confronted with that issue in Commissionerv. Tufts. 47
In Tufts, a partnership acquired a building using nonrecourse financing.4
After an economic downturn, the partnership was unable to continue to
make the required payments under the nonrecourse mortgage and the
lender threatened to foreclose on the property. 9 The partnership found a
buyer for the property who agreed to pay it a nominal amount and take the
building subject to the nonrecourse mortgage.5 ° At the time of the sale,
however, the amount of the nonrecourse mortgage exceeded the
partnership's basis in the building, and that basis exceeded the fair market
value of the building."
Each partner reported the sale on his individual return and "indicated"
that a partnership loss had been sustained, but no partner claimed a
deduction for his share of the loss (excess of adjusted basis over fair
market value at the time of sale) on his individual return.52 The
Commissioner determined that the amount realized on the sale was equal
to the amount outstanding on the nonrecourse mortgage and the
partnership realized a gain since the amount of the mortgage exceeded the
partnership's adjusted basis in the property.53 The Court agreed with the
Commissioner and reasoned that Crane applied even if the market value
of the property was less than the amount of the mortgage. 4 The Court
concluded that since the partners were allowed depreciation deductions as
a result of the basis created by the acquisition of the building with nonN. Shaviro, Risk and Accrual: The Tax Treatment of Nonrecourse Debt, 44 TAX. L. REv. 401
(1988)).
45. See infra Part VI for discussion of the FLIPS and related tax shelters.
46. Crane, 331 U.S. at 14 n.37 ("Obviously, if the value of the property is less than the
amount of the mortgage, a mortgagor who is not personally liable cannot realize a benefit equal to
the mortgage. Consequently, a different problem might be encountered where a mortgagor
abandoned the property or transferred it subject to the mortgage without receiving boot. That is not
this case.").
47. 461 U.S. 300 (1983).
48. Id. at 302.
49. Id. at 303, 305.
50. Id. at 303.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 307.
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recourse debt, the full amount of the debt must be included in the amount
realized on disposition.
Justice O'Connor, in her concurring opinion, agreed with the majority
that the ruling in Cranerequired the inclusion in the amount realized of the
full amount of debt assumed.56 O'Connor, however, stated that there was
merit in the position offered by Professor Wayne Barnett, as amicus
curiae, that the transaction should be treated as two separate transactions
involving both a disposition of property at a loss and also a discharge of
indebtedness income for the excess of the amount of the nonrecourse
liability over the fair market value of the property at disposition.5
O'Connor acknowledged that the majority opinion reached the correct
result because of the great body of case law and promulgated treasury
regulations that interpreted I.R.C. § 1001 to require that relief from debt,
even nonrecourse debt, is included in the amount realized on disposition
of property.58
O'Connor's concurring opinion suggests, however, that had she been
confronted with a "clean slate," without any established precedent on the
issue, she may have reached a completely different result from Crane.5 9
Both the majority opinion and O'Connor's concurring opinion
acknowledge that the interpretation of the law sought by the Commissioner
in Crane, supported in many cases litigated by the Commissioner over
time-and promulgated in Treasury regulations allowing taxpayers to
receive a basis for property acquired through nonrecourse financing-is
a discretionary interpretation that could be reversed by Congress through
amendments to the Code or by the Treasury with changes to the
regulations.'

55. Id. at 307-08.
56. Id. at 317 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
57. Id. at 317-20; see id. at 310 n.1 1 (majority opinion) ("Professor Wayne G. Barnett, as
amicus in the present case, argues that the liability and property portions of the transaction should
be accounted for separately. Under his view, there was a transfer of the property for $1.4 million,
and there was a cancellation of the $1.85 million obligation for a payment of $1.4 million. The
former resulted in a capital loss of $50,000, and the latter in the realization of $450,000 of ordinary
income. Taxation of the ordinary income might be deferred under § 108 by a reduction of
respondents' bases in their partnership interests.").
58. Id. at 319-20 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
59. Id. at 317-18 ("Craneestablished that a taxpayer could treat property as entirely his own,
in spite of the 'coinvestment' provided by his mortgagee in the form of a nonrecourse loan. That
is, the full basis of the property, with all its tax consequences, belongs to the mortgagor. That rule
alone, though, does not in any way tie nonrecourse debt to the cost of property or to the proceeds
upon disposition.").
60. See id.at 308 n.5 (majority opinion) ("The Commissioner might have adopted the theory,
implicit in Crane's contentions, that a nonrecourse mortgage is not true debt, but, instead, is a form
of joint investment by the mortgagor and the mortgagee. On this approach, nonrecourse debt would
be considered a contingent liability, under which the mortgagor's payments on the debt gradually
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The Court's opinion in Tufts illustrates that much of the complexity
inherent in the tax law is the result of both complex economic transactions
and choices made by both Congress and the Treasury Department
(including the IRS) that create the rules for determining taxpayers' taxable
income. Lawmakers (Congress and the Treasury) have the choice when
they create the rules whether they want the rules to be objective or
subjective. There are costs and benefits associated with each. In the case
of nonrecourse debt used to acquire property, the rulemakers chose an
objective rule: Nonrecourse debt is included in the cost basis of acquiring
property and relief from nonrecourse debt is included in the amount
realized on disposition of property.6' The use of an objective rule reduces
uncertainty and decreases the likelihood of litigation. An objective rule,
however, also provides an opportunity for clever planning that uses
"loopholes" in the rules to the advantage of certain taxpayers.62
Congress was, and still is, free to legislate a reversal of the rule and
corollary from Crane. It could choose to amend §§ 1001 and 1012 of the
Code to respecting nonrecourse debt as part of the cost basis of acquiring
an asset only when the buyer has made an economic investment in the
property either by contributing capital to use as a down payment or by
using recourse debt that creates personal liability to finance a portion of
the property. 63 This would ensure that taxpayers did not receive basis when
they didn't commit any capital. Such a decision also would put taxpayers
on notice of the requirements of the law before the transaction, and the
risks associated with uncertainty from a subjective rule would have to be
factored into the taxpayer's decision. For whatever reason, Congress has
chosen not to exercise its power to alter the rule from Crane.'

increase his interest in the property while decreasing that of the mortgagee."); id. at 317-18
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
61. Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-2 (1980).
62. The use of the objective rule in the case of nonrecourse debt allowed some of the tax
shelters in the 1980s. See generallyPollack & Soled, supranote 11 (discussing the transactions that
used nonrecourse debt to create tax losses without any economic loss). Oddly enough, to counteract
the tax shelters that were created by taking advantage of the rule allowing taxpayers to obtain a
basis in assets acquired with nonrecourse loans, Congress, instead of choosing to convert the rule
regarding basis and amount realized to a subjective rule based on the economic substance of the
transaction (whether the borrower truly purchased the property or whether it was a coinvestment
between the borrower and lender), decided to create an overall subjective rule restricting deduction
of losses from activities in which the taxpayer does not "materially participate." See I.R.C. § 469
(2004); Pollack & Soled, supra note 11, at 202.
63. In such a situation the degree of subjectivity would also be up to Congress. Congress
could choose to use a vague term, such as a "significant investment" in which the buyer assumes
part of the risks of a decrease in value, or a specific term, such as "20% of the fair market value of
the building."
64. It is possible that Congress agrees with the treatment of nonrecourse debt created by
Crane and Tufts. On the other hand, it is possible that those who benefit from those rules were
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This somewhat lengthy discussion about the Crane and Tufts decisions
demonstrates that the technical "loopholes" that are decried by proponents
of the substance over form doctrines are the result of choices made by
Congress and the IRS. Just as taxpayers must live with the consequences
of the forms of transactions they have chosen, the government should have
to live with the consequences of the laws it enacts and the rulings it seeks.
And just as taxpayers can learn from their past mistakes, Congress and the
IRS can correct the technical "loopholes" they do not like through
amendments to the Code or regulations65 and can learn from past mistakes
in drafting future language of tax rules.
Ill. DEVELOPMENT OF THE ECONOMIC SUBSTANCE DOCTRINE: HEADS
THE GOVERNMENT WINS, TAILS THE TAXPAYER LOSES

Helvering v. Gregory,' the case that "popularized"67 the economic
substance doctrine, began with a statement that should have made the
taxpayer smile: "Any one may so arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be
as low as possible; he is not bound to choose the pattern which will best
pay the Treasury; there is not even a patriotic duty to increase one's
taxes., 68 Despite this clear statement by the court that appeared to indicate
that taxpayers were free to engage in transactions that gave them beneficial
tax consequences, the court held the taxpayer was not entitled to tax
treatment afforded by the statute because "Congress [had not] meant [for
the statute] to cover such a transaction."' 69 Gregory concerned a taxpayer
who was the sole shareholder of a corporation that had a subsidiary that
the corporation wanted to sell to an unrelated party.7" If the corporation
had sold the stock of the subsidiary and then distributed the proceeds to the
shareholder, the corporation would have been taxed on the gain on
disposal of the stock and the shareholder would have been taxed on the
distribution of a dividend. 1
To prevent the double taxation of the gain, the corporation could have
distributed the stock of the subsidiary to the shareholder who would have
been taxed on the distribution as a dividend and received a basis equal to

successful in lobbying Congress not to override them.
65. The IRS can eliminate "loopholes" through changing regulations only when the
"loopholes" were created through regulations. The IRS cannot alter the provisions of the Code
through regulations, but it may issue interpretive regulations that are persuasive authority as to the
meaning of certain Code provisions.
66. 69 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1934), af'd, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
67. Hariton, supra note 30, at 241.
68. Gregory, 69 F.2d at 810.
69. Id.
70. Hariton, supra note 30, at 241.
71. Id. at 241-42.
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the fair market value of the stock.72 Under the then-valid General Utilities
doctrine," the corporation would not have recognized any gain on the
distribution of appreciated property.74 The shareholder would then sell the
stock of the subsidiary to the unrelated party." Mrs. Gregory's tax
planners, however, came up with an even better solution. 76 They arranged
what was the equivalent for that time of a "tax-free spinoff' of the
subsidiary by creating a new corporation and transferring to the new
corporation all of the stock of the subsidiary while the new corporation
simultaneously issued all of its stock to Mrs. Gregory.77 The new
corporation was soon liquidated with its only asset, the stock of the
subsidiary, distributed to its sole shareholder, Mrs. Gregory. 78 Mrs.
Gregory only recognized part of the gain inherent in the subsidiary's stock
on receipt of the stock because part of her basis in the stock of the parent
company was allowed to be transferred to be her basis in the stock of the
new corporation upon the reorganization.79
The Commissioner sought to apply the step-transaction doctrine and
disregard the formation of the new corporation.8 0 Although the Second
Circuit stated the transaction could not be ignored, it ultimately reached
the same result as the Commissioner by recharacterizing the distribution
in liquidation of the new corporation." The United States Supreme Court
affirmed the decision of the Second Circuit.82 Even though the language
in the statute was clear and no one contested whether the language was
applicable to the facts, both the Second Circuit and the Supreme Court
disregarded the statute because in the Courts' subjective opinions, the
transaction was not what Congress had intended when drafting the
statute.83
The decisions in Gregory were seriously flawed. Even those who
support application of the economic substance doctrine are troubled by the

72. Id.
73. See Gen. Utils. & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935); PAuLR. MCDANIEL
ETAL., FEDERALINCOME TAXATION OFCORPORATIONS 202-04 (2d ed. 1999). The GeneralUtilities
doctrine has been overruled by congressional action and now corporations are required to recognize
gain upon the distribution of appreciated property to shareholders. See I.R.C. § 311 (b) (2000).
74. Hariton, supra note 30, at 242.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934), aft'd, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
81. Id. at 811.
82. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
83. Hariton, supra note 30, at 243.
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application of the doctrine to the facts in Gregory.84 In the case, it was not
disputed that the corporation had the right to distribute the appreciated
property to its shareholder without recognizing gain." The only issues
were whether the shareholder could defer recognition of part of the gain
by transferring some of her basis in the stock of the parent to the stock of
the new corporation formed in the "reorganization" and change the
character from ordinary dividend income to capital gain.86 This is the exact
situation Hariton described when he stated that proper application of the
economic substance doctrine would not overturn the results of simply a
"tax-advantaged way of executing a transaction." 87 In Gregory, there were
substantial changes in the economic positions of both the shareholder and
the corporation. A transfer in the ownership of a subsidiary corporation
occurred. The use of a newly formed corporation to have the transfer be
characterized as a reorganization was simply a more tax efficient way of
distributing the property.
Nevertheless, "Judge Hand disallowed the results of Mrs. Gregory's
spinoff because he did not like them, and he made no bones about it."'88
Although Hariton called this "a refreshingly honest approach,''89 it is not
the appropriate role for a judge to disregard the clear language of a statute
because he disagrees with the result.9' In Gregory, Judge Hand as well as

84. See id. at 243-44 ("[Tlhere are some serious problems with the Gregory
decision... Judge Hand's statutory analysis was a bit self-serving.").
85. Id. at 244.
86. It is not clear from the court opinions if, based on the law at the time, there was any
preference given to capital gains as opposed to ordinary income. See id.
87. Hariton, supra note 30, at 236.
88. Id. at 245.
89. Id.
90. See Bank One Chi., N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264, 279 (1996)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Justice Scalia said:
The law is what the law says, and we should content ourselves with reading it
rather than psychoanalyzing those who enacted it. Moreover, even if subjective
intent rather than textually expressed intent were the touchstone, it is a fiction of
Jack-and-the-Beanstalk proportions to assume that more than a handful of those
Senators and Members of the House who voted for the final version of the
Expedited Funds Availability Act, and the President who signed it, were, when
they took those actions, aware of the drafting evolution that the Court describes;
and if they were, that their actions in voting for or signing the final bill show that
they had the same "intent" which that evolution suggests was in the minds of the
drafters.
Id. (citations omitted). In Gregory, the language in the statute was clear:
The provisions of the section, so far as they are pertinent to the question here
(g) Distribution
'Sec. 112.
presented,
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the Supreme Court did not find that the statute required a transaction to
have economic substance to make the statute applicable.9' The opinions
attempted to psychoanalyze what was in the mind of Congress instead of
simply applying the statute as written to the facts of the case. By
introducing this subjectivity into the application of the law, the decision
in Gregory is partly responsible for the lack of consistency in recent cases
where the government has invoked the economic substance doctrine.92

is distributed, in pursuance of a plan of reorganization, to a shareholder in a
corporation a party to the reorganization, stock or securities in such corporation
or in another corporation a party to the reorganization, without the surrender by
such shareholder of stock or securities in such a corporation, no gain to the
distributee from the receipt of such stock of securities shall be recognized....
'(i) Definition of Reorganization. As used in this section...
'(1) The term 'reorganization' means ... (B) a transfer by a corporation of all or
a part of its assets to another corporation if immediately after the transfer the
transferor or its stockholders or both are in control of the corporation to which the
assets are transferred....
Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 468 (1935) (format in original).
The law enacted by Congress was clear and applied to the facts in Gregory. The courts
disregarded it because they attempted to characterize subjectively the "intended" result Congress
would have desired.
91. Much of the discussion in both the Second Circuit's and Supreme Court's opinions
relating to the transaction refer to how the transaction did not meet the economic meaning of the
term "reorganization." See id. at 469-70; Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 811 (2d Cir. 1934).
While that may be entirely true, it is also entirely irrelevant. In the statute before the court,
Congress specifically defined what the term reorganization meant for purposes of that Code section.
Therefore, since the transaction met the definition of reorganization under the statute, it makes no
difference that it was not a reorganization in the economic sense. In many classes in business
schools in colleges and universities, the instructions to exams generally include a directive to
assume a 360-day year so that allocations based upon months can be made evenly. Just as business
school professors can, through words written on a paper, speed up the revolution of the Earth
around the sun, Congress can, through words enacted as part of the Internal Revenue Code, alter
the meaning of words from their ordinary economic meaning.
92. There are numerous other cases affirming judicial use of the economic substance doctrine
to overrule the results of cases where the taxpayer would receive tax benefits that the court
subjectively viewed the taxpayer did not deserve. Even when the Code allowed deductions for
personal interest (interest on personal debt, not only residential and gain-seeking debt), the court
disallowed deductions for prepaid interest on a loan in which the proceeds were used to purchase
treasury securities. Goldstein v. Comm'r, 364 F.2d 734, 739 (2d Cir. 1966). The taxpayer had
engaged in the transaction as a way to allow her to offset some of her income from winning a
sweepstakes and essentially allow her to average her income over a number of years to avoid high
marginal tax rates. See Hariton, supra note 30, at 246-49. The court, instead of recognizing that
Congress's decision to allow deduction of prepaid interest could result in taxpayers having the
ability to use that rule to average income, disallowed the result because there was no economic
substance in borrowing money to buy short-term treasury securities. Id.
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IV. THE WINDS BLOW THE STENCH OF CORPORATE TAX SHELTERS
THROUGH THE COURTROOM: AMAZINGLY THE GOVERNMENT WINS
SOME CASES WITH THE "HEADS THE GOVERNMENT WINS, TAILS THE

TAXPAYER LOSES" RULE

The government has experienced some success in litigating cases
involving corporate "tax shelters" by invoking the economic substance
doctrine and convincing courts, including district courts, the Tax Court,
and the courts of appeals, to disregard the technical result of applying the
statute when the corporation engaged in actual transactions that lacked
economic substance. Even though the transactions actually occurred and
the treatment the taxpayer sought indisputably fell within the plain
meaning of the technical Code or Regulation provisions the taxpayer
sought to invoke, the courts applied the economic substance doctrine and
reversed the results of the statute because they subjectively viewed the
result as improper. As these cases were decided, there was no push to
codify or enhance the economic substance doctrine because the subjective
views of the courts matched the subjective views of those who were
opposed to corporate use of technical Code provisions to reduce the
corporation's tax liability. What the reasoning from these opinions
indicates is that the courts substitute their view of what the law should be
and how the tax law should operate for what the statute actually says.
A. ACM Partnership v. Commissioner93
In 1988, Colgate Palmolive Company realized and recognized over
$100 million in long-term capital gains attributable to the sale of a
subsidiary.94 In 1989, a representative from Merrill Lynch approached
Colgate and proposed a way to use an offshore partnership to generate
capital losses that could be carried back and used to offset the gain
recognized in 1988. 9' Initially, Colgate's officers would not enter into the
arrangement out of concern that the IRS would challenge it under the
economic substance doctrine. 96 After receiving an opinion from a law firm
that the plan would work to generate the sought-after capital losses and
modifying Merrill Lynch's initial plan to incorporate Colgate's repurchase
of its own outstanding debt into the partnership's purpose, Colgate agreed
to enter into the arrangement.97
The plan to generate capital losses started with Colgate, Merrill Lynch,

93. 157 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1998).
94. Id. at 233.
95. Id. See also I.R.C. § 1212(a) (2004) (allowing corporations to carry back capital losses
three years if it sustains losses in any year that exceed its gains).
96. ACM, 157 F.3d at 234.
97. Id. at 234-35, 239.
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and a foreign bank all forming subsidiaries.98 The subsidiaries formed a
partnership and contributed capital in the total amount of $205 million.99
The partnership used the $205 million to purchase Citicorp notes."°
Shortly after purchasing the Citicorp notes, the partnership sold $175
million worth of the notes to two foreign banks for cash totaling $140
million and contingent future payments based on the LIBOR index rate
worth slightly over $34 million.''
Since the future payments were tied to the LIBOR rate, the amount
could not be ascertained with certainty and therefore the regulations
promulgated by the Treasury Department regarding contingent installment
sales applied. 102 The regulations required that the basis in the property sold
would be allocated to the years in which payment may be received. 3
Since the contingent notes received by the partnership would make
payments over a five-year period, the partnership had the possibility of
receiving payments (including the up-front cash payment) over a period
of six years." Therefore, only one-sixth of the $175 million basis was
allocated to 1989.105 Therefore, the partnership reported a capital gain of
around $110 million in 1989.1° This gain was allocated to each of the
partners in proportion to its share of the partnership. 10 7 The allocation of
partnership gain resulted in Colgate's subsidiary reporting gain from its

98. Id. at 238-39. See also Hariton, supranote 30, at 262-66. The subsidiaries established by
Colgate and Merrill Lynch were both incorporated in the United States, while the subsidiary formed
by the foreign bank was formed in a tax haven where it would not be subject to income tax. ACM,
157 F.3d at 233.
99. ACM, 157 F.3d at 239. The subsidiary ofthe foreign bank contributed $169.4 million and
held an 82.6% share of the partnership. Id. The subsidiary of Colgate contributed $35 million and
held a 17.1% share. Id. The subsidiary of Merrill Lynch contributed $0.6 million and held a 0.3%
share. Id.
100. Id. The notes paid interest monthly and were floating rate notes based on the LIBOR rate.
The interest rate would change each month depending on movements in the index (LIBOR) to
which the note was pegged. Id. At the time the partnership purchased the notes, the notes were
yielding a rate 0.03% higher than the partnership was earning on its deposit account in the foreign
bank that was the parent of the partner with the largest share (at that time) of the partnership. Id.
101. Id. at 240.
102. Id. at 242.
103. Id. The regulation in question stated: "In general. When a stated maximum selling price
cannot be determined as of the close of the taxable year in which the sale or other disposition
occurs, but the maximum period over which payments may be received under the contingent sale
price agreement is fixed, the taxpayer's basis (inclusive of selling expenses) shall be allocated to
the taxable years in which payment may be received under the agreement in equal annual
increments." Temp. Treas. Reg. § 15a.453-1(c)(3)(I) (as amended in 1994).
104. ACM, 157 F.3d at 242.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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interest in the partnership of almost $19 million."' 8 Of course, the
subsidiary of the foreign bank that was organized in a jurisdiction without
an income tax was allocated over $90 million of the gain.' °9
The partnership used the cash proceeds from the sale to repurchase
outstanding Colgate debt." 0 The partnership then redeemed the interest of
the subsidiary of the foreign bank."1 The partnership, after the subsidiary
of the foreign bank had been redeemed, sold its remaining contingent
installment note and recognized a nearly $85 million loss.1 2 At that point,
the Colgate subsidiary controlled 99.7% of the partnership and was
allocated 99.7% of the loss." 3 Since Colgate's subsidiary now had
majority ownership of the partnership, it consolidated the partnership's
financial statements into its own and effectively cancelled its outstanding
debt." 4 Colgate filed an amended return to carry back its allocated loss to
gain from the sale of one of its subsidiaries in the
offset any 11remaining
5
prior year.
The Commissioner adjusted the partnership's reported gains and losses
and eliminated the partnership's gain on receipt of the cash part of the
contingent installment sale, redetermined the partnership's basis in the
contingent notes, and disallowed the loss from the sale of the final
contingent note." 6 The Tax Court upheld the Commissioner's adjustments,
holding that the transactions "were 'created artificially"' solely to create
tax benefits and the partnership "[was] 'not entitled to recognize a
phantom loss from a transaction that lacks economic substance.""' 7 The
Third Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's ruling disallowing the loss from the

108. Id. Colgate did not actually want to have to pay tax on its allocated portion of the gain,
so the partnership distributed one of the contingent notes that had a significantly higher basis than
its market value and Colgate sold that note before the end of its tax year. Id. at 243. Therefore, even
though Colgate's subsidiary was allocated over $19 million in gain from the partnership, the loss
on the sale of the note offset that gain and generated a net capital loss of over $13 million for the
subsidiary. Id.
109. Id. at 242.
110. Id. at241.
111. Id. at 242.
112. Id. at 243-44.
113. Id. at 244.
114. Id. at 241.
115. See id. at 244; I.R.C. § 1212(a) (2004).
116. ACM, 157 F.3d at 244. It is interesting that neither the Third Circuit opinion nor the Tax
Court's lengthy opinion state what Code section, Regulation, or matter of tax law justifies
allocating the full $140 million in basis to the cash receipts. Presumably, it is based on ignoring the
ratable basis rules required by I.R.C. § 4530)(2) (2004) and Temp. Treas. Reg. § 15a.453- l(c)(3)(i)
(as amended in 1994) and then treating the sale as resulting in no gain or loss and applying I.R.C.
§ 453(c) (2004).
117. ACM, 157 F.3d at 244-45 (quoting ACM v. Commissioner, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2189,2215
(1997)).
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transactions despite finding that the partnerships' transactions, "at least' in18
form, satisfied each requirement of the ...ratable basis recovery rule.""
The partnership argued, based on the Supreme Court's holding in
Cottage Savings Association v. Commissioner,'19 that the courts were
required to respect the tax loss generated by the transactions because the
loss had actually been realized since the sale resulted in the exchange of
assets for other assets that were "materially different."1 20 The majority in
ACM distinguished Cottage Savings because in Cottage Savings the loss
represented an actual economic loss based on a real long-term
investment.1 2' The partnership's loss in ACM, on the other hand, was
created with no real investment or risk and by using the technical rules of
the ratable basis recovery regulation. 122 The majority held that the
provides the technical
Treasury's ratable basis recovery regulation only
"method" for reporting otherwise "deductible" 123 losses. 124

118. Id. at 246. The court reversed the Tax Court's ruling that the partnership was not allowed
to deduct approximately $6 million of loss that was attributable to the decline in value of the
securities held prior to the ultimate sale. That loss was an actual loss and was not artificially created
by, what the majority found to be, an improper use of the ratable basis recovery regulations. The
court found that even though the investment plan as a whole lacked economic substance, there were
actual economic losses that were "separable from the sham aspects of the underlying transaction."
Id. at 260-62.
119. 499 U.S. 554 (1991). In Cottage Savings, the Supreme Court was confronted with the
issue of whether a loss had been realized, when two taxpayers swapped portfolios of mortgages
they each owned in order to realize a loss because the value of the mortgages had decreased in
value due to an increase in interest rates. See ACM, 157 F.3d at 251. The taxpayers sold each other
the other's mortgage portfolio in order to realize what would have been an otherwise unrealized
decline in value. Id. The Supreme Court ruled that because the different mortgages represented
"legally distinct entitlements," the exchange of those entitlements represented a realization event
and allowed the taxpayers to deduct the losses. Id. Neither the majority nor the dissent in Cottage
Savings addressed the issue ofeconomic substance partly because the decrease in value did actually
represent an economic loss to the taxpayers even though the transaction realizing the loss (the
exchange of one portfolio of mortgages for the other) had no economic substance. See Hariton,
supra note 30, at 254-57. The focus of the Supreme Court's opinion was on realization that did not
depend on whether the transaction had economic substance. Id. at 256-57. As Hariton noted, the
nature of whether a loss was realized does not depend on whether the transaction had economic
substance. Id. at 254-55. The rules regarding realization are technical and not in any way based
upon economic substance. Id. If whether a loss was realized depended on whether the transaction
had economic substance, then many of the nonrecognition rules disallowing recognition of realized
gains and losses would be unnecessary. Id.
120. ACM, 157 F.3d at 251.
121. ld. at 251-52.
122. Id. The ACM court noted that in Cottage Savings the Supreme Court stated that the
deductibility of a loss was "allowable only where the taxpayer has sustained a 'bona fide' loss as
determined by its 'substance and not mere form."' Id. at 252 (quoting Cottage Savings Ass'n v.
Comm'r, 499 U.S. 554, 567-68 (1991)).
123. When the court uses the term "deductible," it means a genuine economic loss. The
majority does not consider that whether or not a loss from a sale or exchange of property is a "loss" 22
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The decision in ACM was not unanimous; Judge McKee filed a
dissenting opinion.12 While acknowledging that the majority opinion was
"finely crafted," the dissent pointed out that the economic substance
doctrine should not play a role when the rules regarding realization and
recognition of gains and losses are clear and unambiguous.' 26 Judge
McKee believed that once the court determined that the loss had been
realized under § 1001, the "inquiry should [have] proceed[ed] no
further."' 127 Judge McKee stated that he believed the Supreme Court's
decision in Cottage Savings should lead to a decision in favor of ACM and
attempted to distinguish Gregory,the Supreme Court case that established
Gregorydid not involve an issue
the economic substance doctrine, because
128
about loss realization like ACM did.
In his dissent, Judge McKee reached the right result but for the wrong
reason. He was clearly correct when he stated that the majority's
conclusion was based on "something akin to a 'smell test"' because the
majority subjectively believed that the taxpayer should not be allowed to
engage in a transaction to "put one over on the Commissioner.' ' 129 He was
correct when he stated that the court's responsibility in applying the tax
code is to conduct an inquiry that is "cerebral, not visceral."' 30 But Judge
McKee was not correct when he attempted to distinguish Gregory and
stated that the judicially developed economic substance doctrine is not
applicable to the facts in ACM. 13 ' The majority's decision was incorrect
for purposes of the income tax laws is determined by section 1001 of the Code. I.R.C. § 1001(a)
(2000) provides: "[Tihe loss shall be the excess of the adjusted basis provided in such section for
determining loss over the amount realized." I.R.C. § 1001(c) (2000) provides: "Except as otherwise
provided in this subtitle, the entire amount of the gain or loss, determined under this section, on the
sale or exchange of property shall be recognized." The Code, therefore, defines when a loss has
been realized and recognized from the sale or exchange of property.
124. ACM, 157 F.3d at 252.
125. Id. at 263-65 (McKee, J., dissenting).
126. Id. See supra note 122.
dissenting).
127. ACM, 157 F.3d at 265 (McKee, J.,
128. Id. at 263-64.
129. Id. at265.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 263-64. One could conceivably argue whether the transaction objectively lacked
economic substance. Even the majority agreed that part of the loss was a genuine loss with
economic substance and reversed the part of the Tax Court decision regarding the deductibility of
the portion of the partnership's loss that was caused by adverse changes in interest rates and
fluctuations in the market value of the contingent notes prior to the partnership's ultimate sale of
the notes. Id. at 260-63 (majority opinion). See also infra note 133 and accompanying text. Even
though the partnership realized a $6 million actual substantive economic loss on the transaction,
it is likely that since the loss was caused by changes in interest rates, the partners were able to
effectively hedge, outside of the partnership, any real economic risk to which they exposed
themselves. See Hariton, supra note 30, at 264. Even ignoring the likelihood of the economic risk
being hedged, the fact that a small economic loss resulted from the transaction did not mean the
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not because Gregory did not apply,1 32 but rather because Gregory
represented an improper exercise of judicial activism. 133
B. Long Term Capital Holdings v. United States

34

Long Term Capital Partners (LTCP) arguably could be considered the
most famous, and possibly infamous, hedge fund in history. 135 LTCP was
managed by some of the most prominent figures in the fields of finance
137
and economics13 6 as a hedge fund that managed, for a substantial fee,

investments for wealthy individuals.138 The hedge fund ultimately
collapsed in 1998 as a result of the fund being too highly leveraged and
ultimately defaulting on its loans in a way that threatened to cause a
collapse in the United States banking system. 139 The downfall of LTCP is
only tangentially related to the dispute with the IRS over the tax treatment
it sought for particular transactions in which it engaged in order to
generate losses to offset the principals' gains from their own holdings in
Long Term Capital." 4
overall transaction had economic substance. See id. at 236. However, no one could argue with a
straight face that this transaction was anything but a clever way to use an arbitrary rule enacted by
the government to the advantage of the taxpayer. Even with the partnership repurchasing
outstanding Colgate debt, the transaction involving the asset swap for contingent notes had no
business purpose. Id.
132. In both ACM and Gregory, the relevant statutory sections were clear and had no
subjective economic standards for a court to apply. In Gregory, there was a clear definition of
"reorganization for a court to apply." See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text. In ACM, there
was a clear definition of loss on sale or exchange and a clear regulation existed for allocating the
basis to the proceeds from the sale or exchange. See I.R.C. § 1001(a) (2000); I.R.C. § 4530)(2)
(2004); Cottage Savings Ass'n v. Comm'r, 499 U.S. 554, 567-68 (1991); Temp. Treas. Reg.
§ 15a.453-1(c)(3)(I) (as amended in 1994).
133. ACM, 157 F.3d at 265 (McKee, J., dissenting) ("To the extent that the Commissioner is
offended by these transactions he should address Congress and/or the rulemaking process, and not
the Courts."). In addition, Judge McKee also noted that the Commissioner did promulgate a new
regulation to prevent partnerships from using this type of transaction to generate losses in the
future. Id. at 265 n.2.
134. 330 F. Supp. 2d 122 (D. Conn. 2004), affid, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 20988 (2d Cir. Sept.
27, 2005).
135. Mark H. Leeds & Jeffrey L. Rubinger, When Common Sense Failed:Tax PlanningAfter
Long Term Capital, 105 TAX NOTEs 237, 237 (2005).
136. Long Term Capital,330 F. Supp. 2d at 128-29. The list of principals included some of
the most well-respected professors of finance and economics at the nation's most elite universities
and included two Nobel Laureates in the field of economics. See id. at 124 nn.3-4 & 6.
137. LTCP charged its investors annual management fees of 2% of fund assets plus 25% of
the fund's gross return after the 2% of asset management fee. Id. at 130.
138. Id. at 129-31.
139. See Leeds & Rubinger, supra note 135, at 237 (stating that the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York had to intervene to prevent a "systemic collapse").
140. The only way the two are related concerns a procedural argument regarding the extent 24
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689

The specific transactions in question in Long Term Capitalinvolved a
series of transactions between numerous parties. For the sake of brevity,
I will only summarize the transactions and will not go through a detailed
explanation of the technical steps of the transactions.' 4 ' The basic objective
of the plan was to capitalize on the difference between the tax treatment
given to prepayments of leases in the United States and the United
Kingdom.1 42 In the United States, lease prepayments are taxed upon
receipt, while in the United Kingdom, income from leases is accrued as
earned throughout the lease. 143 The key to get the tax benefits sought by
the architects of the plan'" was to have an entity that was organized in the
U.K. sublease computer hardware already leased to end users and then
sublease it to a U.S. partnership. 45 The U.S. partnership would then
borrow money to prepay its sublease obligation to the U.K. entity.'1 6 The
U.K. entity, subject to U.K. taxes and not U.S. taxes, would recognize no
income on the prepayment.14 7 Even though it was not subject to U.S. tax
liability, it would recognize income for U.S. tax purposes and therefore
have a full tax basis in the cash it received from the prepayments. 48 The
U.K. entity would then "strip" 149 away the sublease revenues from the
lease payments and transfer to a newly formed subsidiary of a U.S.
corporation the assets acquired with the cash paid by the U.S. partnership
for the prepayment of rent (a U.S. Treasury Bill) and the obligation to

of the partners' liability to the government after the court disallowed the tax treatment LTCP sought
for the transactions. Long Term argued that since the disallowed loss would have increased the
partners' share of partnership income in 1997 and also increased their basis in their share of the
partnership, when LTCP collapsed in 1998, the higher basis would have simply resulted in a larger
loss when the partnership collapsed. Therefore, LTCP argued that the only thing the partners' owed
the government was the interest on the money for one year. See Alvin C. Warren, Jr.,
UnderstandingLong Term Capital, 106 TAx NOTEs 681, 694 (2005).
141. For a detailed discussion of the steps in the transactions, see Warren, supra note 140.
142. Long Term Capital,330 F. Supp. 2d at 132; see also Warren, supra note 140, at 682.
143. See Leeds & Rubinger, supra note 135, at 238-39.
144. This was not a transaction devised by the principals of LTCP. It was a "tax product"
created by a business investment-consulting firm and later "sold" to LTCP. Id. at 241.
145. Long Term Capital,330 F. Supp. 2d at 132-34. In reality, the transactions in dispute
involved two different types of transactions, CHIPS and TRIPS. Id. at 132. The CHIPS transactions
involved the leases described in the text, while the TRIPS transactions involved the sale and
leaseback of trucks owned by Walmart. Id. at 132-35. In both transactions the tax issues were
identical so the differences are ignored in this Note.
146. Id. at 134; see also Warren, supra note 140, at 682.
147. Long Term Capital,330 F. Supp. 2d at 134; see also Warren, supra note 140, at 682.
148. Long Term Capital,330 F. Supp. 2d at 135-36; see also Warren, supranote 140, at 68283.
149. By "strip," the authors generally mean separate to the extent that the nontaxable entity
(for U.S. tax purposes) recognizes all of the income from the lease and transfers the proceeds and
the remaining lease liability (future deductions) to a U.S. taxpayer. Warren, supra note 140, at 68283.
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make the sublease payments in exchange for preferred stock of the
subsidiary.1 50 The U.K. entity would then form a partnership with LTCP
and contribute its preferred stock in the subsidiary, which had negligible
value and a high basis, as part of its contribution to the partnership. 5 '
Essentially, the plan allowed the U.K. entity to receive payments that
would have been taxable (in the U.S., not the U.K.), creating a U.S. tax
basis in the cash received as a prepayment and also allowing the U.S.
subsidiary to deduct the payments it made on the lease obligations it
assumed with no corresponding inclusion for any lease revenue. Also, the
basis created for the U.K. entity was later "sold"
to LTCP through the
52
partnership between LTCP and the U.K. entity.1
Although the district court 53 case only dealt with the transactions
between the U.K. entity and LTCP, the transaction actually created double
deductions for the "phantom" loss: first, the U.S. subsidiary received
deductions for lease payments made out of the assets it received during its
formation; and second, LTCP received a loss deduction for a capital loss
based on the sale of the subsidiary's preferred stock with the U.K. entity's
inflated basis carried over when the U.K. entity formed the partnership
with LTCP. 154 The district court upheld the Commissioner's deficiency and
imposition of penalties based on the economic substance and steptransaction doctrines.5 5 The imposition of penalties on the taxpayer
despite the taxpayer's receipt of an opinion letter from a reputable law
firm demonstrated that opinion letters would no longer prevent the
imposition of penalties. 156 The district court's opinion was affirmed by the
57
Second Circuit Court of Appeals.
Even though the transactions and purported tax effects in LTCP are
troubling, especially the ability to generate the double deduction of a non-

150. Id. at 682-84.
151. Id. at 685.
152. See Leeds & Rubinger, supra note 135, at 241.
153. Warren hypothesizes that the reason LTCP paid the deficiency and chose to litigate the
matter in district court was because taxpayers were having little success in the Tax Court in cases
involving corporate tax shelters challenged by the IRS under the economic substance doctrine.
Further, LTCP hoped that a district court judge would be unable to "master the intricacies of...
a transaction executed by leaders in the world of finance." Warren, supra note 140, at 686.
154. Many commentators were most concerned about the transaction's ability to create double
deductions from a "phantom" loss. See, e.g., id. at 684-85. Even if courts were to allow the
transactions to be given tax effect, the implementation of I.R.C. § 362(e), which prevents importing
losses into a corporation, would preclude the double deduction, but not a single deduction, of the
phantom loss.
155. Long Term Capital, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 170-71.
156. See Leeds & Rubinger, supra note 135, at 243-44 (providing advice to both taxpayers and
practitioners regarding the risks involved in planning aggressive tax avoidance transactions).
157. Long Term Capital Holdings v. United States, No. 04-5687, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS
20988 (2d Cir. Sept. 27, 2005) (per curiam).
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economic loss, it is not at all clear that the same outcome that the court
reached could not have also been attained by applying other provisions of
the tax law without resorting to the economic substance doctrine. Even if
the same result could not have been achieved under other provisions of the
law, it does not follow that it is appropriate for a court to disregard the
results of applying the law to the facts just because it disagrees with the
result.
First, with regard to the subsidiary's ability to deduct the lease
payments it makes after incorporation, Congress has recognized the
problems that could be created by such transactions and implemented
amendments to the Code to prevent the importation of built-in losses to a
corporation when the transferor was an entity that was not subject to U.S.
tax. 5 ' It certainly would be logical to conclude that if Congress felt that it
needed to enact an additional subsection to prevent these types of
transactions, that the Code, as it existed before the enactment of the
subsection, did not prohibit such an importation of a built-in loss. Despite
the possible smell of such a transaction, it is not the job of any court to
decide what the tax law should be. It is only a job of the courts to apply the
law to a given set of facts.
Second, the court, if it desired, could have reached the exact same
result if it applied the corporate formation rules strictly against the U.K.
entity. The capital loss that LTCP attempted to create with its partnership
with the U.K. entity depended on the U.K. entity receiving a basis in the
preferred stock of the subsidiary that far exceeded its market value. This
result could only have occurred if the U.K. entity could argue that in the
§ 351 transaction where it transferred assets subject to the lease payment
obligation to the subsidiary in exchange for the preferred stock, that its
basis in the preferred stock was not reduced under § 358(d) by the
subsidiary's assumption of its lease payment obligation. The only way the
basis would not be reduced by the assumption of the liability is provided
in § 358(d)(2).' 59 Section 358(d)(2) states that the basis will not be reduced
16
by liabilities "the payment of which... would give rise to a deduction."' 0
The lease liabilities of the U.K. entity would not have given rise to a
deduction for the U.K. entity if it had paid the liabilities because either: 1)
the U.K. entity was not subject to United States taxes; or 2) the payment
of the lease liability would have been directly allocable to a class of
income (the prepayment revenue) that was wholly exempt (by virtue of

158. I.R.C. § 362(e)(1) (2005). This provision was enacted in 2004 by Congress and "applies
principally to transfers by foreign shareholders to U.S. corporations." MCDANIELET AL., supranote
73, at 5.
159. I.R.C. § 358(d)(2) (2002).
160. Id.; I.R.C. §357(c)(3)(A)(I) (2000); see also Warren, supra note 140, at 683.
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the U.K. entity's foreign status) from U.S. income taxes. 161
C. Conclusionsfrom the Cases in Which the Government Has
Prevailedon Economic Substance Grounds
After examining the opinions in the cases in which the government, by
applying the economic substance doctrine, prevailed in disallowing the tax
treatment sought by corporations for certain transactions, one could
conclude that the application of the doctrine is either unnecessary or
inappropriate. The court's application of the economic substance doctrine
in ACM was an inappropriate activist exercise of judicial power to change
the law because the court did not like the result. The court's application of
the economic substance doctrine in Long Term Capital was unnecessary
because proper application of the tax code as it was written would not have
resulted in LTCP receiving the inflated basis in the preferred stock that
they claimed. Even with regard to the aspects of the Long Term Capital
transaction that were not part of the Long Term Capital court opinion'6 2
and would not have been prevented by application of the tax law in force
at the relevant time, Congress's addition of rules to the Code to prevent
such results demonstrates that the proper venue for changing the rules that
create "loopholes" for corporations is Congress, not the courts.
So if, as I argue, it is the role of the legislative or regulatory processes
to close "loopholes" in the tax laws that create the opportunities for
corporations to generate artificial losses (and not to do so retroactively),
how exactly could those processes address transactions similar to those in
ACM? First, the IRS could modify the pro-rata basis recovery regulations
to not apply to transactions where the future payments are determined with
reference to a widely-traded index such as LLBOR.' 63 Second, Congress
could implement a new Code provision in the partnership tax sections that
require a partnership to recapture gains allocated to entities that are not
subject to U.S. taxation before it may allocate any losses to U.S. taxpayers.
Such a provision would address a wide array of transactions that create

161. I.R.C. § 265(a)(1) (2004) disallows the deduction of "[a]ny amount otherwise allowable
as a deduction which is allocable to one or more classes of income other than interest (whether or
not any amount of income of that class or classes is received or accrued) wholly exempt from the
taxes imposed by this subtitle."
162. The deductibility of the lease payments by the subsidiary was not at issue in Long Term
Capital because it had no impact on LTCP.
163. See supra notes 100, 112 and accompanying text. The regulations could also devise a
system where taxpayers are required to use various valuation models to value the contingent
payments and adjust the ratable basis recovery if the result of applying a straight ratable basis
recovery would result in a recognition of gain or loss that was more than a certain percentage (say
20%) deviation from the estimated gross profit or loss on the sale using the estimated value of the
contingent payments.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol58/iss3/4

28

SHELTERS AND THE ECONOMIC SUBSTANCE DOCTRINE
Glassman: "It'sTAX
Not
a Lie if You Believe It": Tax Shelters and the Economic

artificial losses for U.S. taxpayers by creating transactions that generate
large, but offsetting gains and losses and allocate the gains to entities not
subject to U.S. taxation and the losses to U.S. taxpayers. 164 Either action
would not change the result of cases decided under the old rules, but would
prevent similar transactions from working in the future.
V. THE WINDS BLOW THE STENCH OF CORPORATE TAX SHELTERS
AWAY FROM THE COURTROOM: THE TAXPAYERS PREVAIL IN
LITIGATING CORPORATE TAX SHELTERS

The lawyers for the IRS have learned the problem with advocating a
rule that depends on the subjective interpretation of the judge or judges
who hear the case: Sometimes the judges do not share the same subjective
outrage as the IRS. The cases discussed in this section rule in favor of the
taxpayer in cases involving transactions that were, at least substantially
and most likely entirely, motivated by obtaining tax benefits. In these
cases, the courts did not rule that the economic substance doctrine was
inapplicable or an inappropriate exercise of judicial power. 165 Instead, the
courts of appeals found that the transactions in question had economic
substance and reversed decisions of the lower courts that disallowed the
corporations' desired tax treatment.' 66 These decisions reach the correct
result, but the stated reasons for those results, that the transactions had
economic substance, is wrong. The results are right because the tax law
provisions that create the results do not require that there be economic
substance to the transactions.

164. Just as Congress made the determination that the loss generating activity of the 1970s and
1980s justified enacting the passive loss limitations, see supra note 62 and accompanying text,
whether the use of foreign entities to create artificial losses is a problem large enough to justify
enacting a new provision that would have compliance costs and the possibility to ensnare legitimate
activities is a decision that is best left to Congress.
165. Presumably, based on Supreme Court cases like Gregory and others, the Courts of
Appeals would not be able to hold that the economic substance doctrine is an illegal use ofjudicial
power. Therefore, the judges who disagree with this type of judicial legislating are forced into a
position where they must distinguish the facts of the case to find that there is economic substance
to the transaction.
166. Compare Compaq Computer v. Comm'r, 277 F.3d 778 (5th Cir. 2001), with IES Indus.
v. United States, 253 F.3d 350 (8th Cir. 2001), and United Parcel Serv. v. Comm'r, 254 F.3d 1014
(1 th Cir. 2001).
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A. IES Industries v. United States'67 and Compaq Computer v.
Commissioner' 68
U.S. taxpayers are entitled to receive a tax credit on their U.S. income
taxes for the amount they pay in foreign income taxes. 69 Most foreign
countries, like the United States, tax dividends received by the taxpayer as
income. 70
' Because the financial markets are more efficient than the United
States Congress, the existence of the foreign tax credit combined with the
way capital markets treat dividends on a stock that are to be received by
the holder of stock created the opportunity for corporations to exploit a
"loophole" in the tax code. If a corporation had capital gain income that
could be offset with capital losses, it could use the disparity between the
efficient way financial markets treated dividends to be received to obtain
the benefits of the foreign tax credit without any economic cost of actually
having a decrease in wealth by paying the foreign tax.
There are three relevant dates in terms of a company declaring and
paying dividends. These dates are: 1) the date of declaration, which is
when the company's board of directors announces that the company will
pay a dividend; 2) the date of record (ex-dividend), which is when it is
determined who is entitled to receive the dividend; and 3) the date of
payment, which is when the dividend is actually paid. Because of the way
the mechanics of these transactions work, it is possible for stockholders to
own the stock for a very short period of time and still obtain the right to
receive the dividend if they owned the stock at the moment it went exdividend. Because the financial markets are fairly efficient at valuing
securities, the prices in these markets generally adjust at the point the stock
goes ex-dividend to reflect the reality that anyone who buys the stock after
that point will not be entitled to receive the next dividend. Additionally,
the financial markets adjust the price of the stock based on the after-tax
cost of the dividend because that is the true cost of buying after the exdividend date. 71

167. 253 F.3d 350 (8th Cir. 2001).
168. 277 F.3d 778 (5th Cir. 2001).
169. I.R.C. §§ 901-903 (2005). A tax credit reduces a taxpayer's tax liability dollar-for-dollar
by the amount of a credit. By contrast, a tax deduction reduces a taxpayer's taxable income and
only reduces his tax liability by the amount of the deduction times the taxpayer's marginal tax rate.
170. Since 2003, the United States has taxed dividends to individuals at the same preferential
rate as long-term capital gains under I.R.C. § l(h)(1 1) (2004). Also, in the United States,
corporations are entitled to a dividends-received deduction under I.R.C. § 246 (2004) for between
70% and 100% of the dividends they receive from U.S. corporations.
171. For example, if a stock was trading for $50 a share after the company declared a $1 per
share dividend and the tax rate on dividends was 25%, up until the point when the stock went exdividend it would continue to trade at $50 per share. The $50 per share price represents the
combined price of the share of stock and the $1 per share dividend. Since we know that dividends
are taxed at a rate of 25%. then the after-tax value of the dividend is $0.75. Therefore, the share of
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In IES and Compaq, the taxpayers bought shares of foreign stocks
immediately before they went ex-dividend and sold them immediately
after they went ex-dividend.'72 The taxpayers in these transactions sold the
stock back to the party they bought it from at a price that represented the
price they bought it for less the after-tax value of the dividend. 73 They
therefore realized a capital loss that could be used to offset capital gain
income in either the current year or prior years to which the companies
could carry back the capital loss. 174 Since the companies owned the stock
at the moment it went ex-dividend, they were entitled to receive the
dividend and, additionally, they received the after-tax amount of the
dividend because the foreign taxes on the dividend income were withheld
from the payment.175 Aside from transaction costs that the companies had
to pay, the amount of cash the companies received from the dividends
(after the foreign taxes were withheld) exactly equaled the amount of
cash "76
' the companies lost on the buying and selling transactions.'77
For their U.S. tax returns the companies reported the gross amount of
dividend income and reported capital losses for the differences in the price
at which they bought and sold the stock and included most of the
transaction costs in the capital loss as either part of the basis of the stock
acquired or as a reduction of the amount realized on the sale.' 78 The
companies also claimed a foreign tax credit in the amount of the taxes on
' The IRS challenged the tax
the dividend paid to the foreign government. 79
treatment from the transactions and assessed deficiencies against the
companies.1 80 IES paid the deficiency and sued for a refund in district
court, while Compaq challenged the Commissioner's assessment of the
deficiency in the Tax Court."8 ' In both lower court proceedings, the courts
disallowed the use of the foreign tax credit on the grounds that the
transaction lacked any economic substance or potential for profit apart
stock without the dividend is worth $49.25. The efficient financial market will adjust the price of
the stock to $49.25 immediately upon the stock going ex-dividend to reflect the value of the stock
without the next dividend.
172. Compaq, 277 F.3d at 780; IES, 253 F.3d at 351-52.
173. Compaq, 277 F.3d at 780; IES, 253 F.3d at 352.
174. Compaq, 277 F.3d at 780; IES, 253 F.3d at 352.
175. Compaq, 277 F.3d at 780; IES, 253 F.3d at 352.
176. Compaq, 277 F.3d at 780; IES, 253 F.3d at 352. The companies did not actually use their
own cash for the transactions. They bought the foreign stock using margin loans from the
investment firm that facilitated the transactions. Compaq, 277 F.3d at 780. Presumably, the
payment of interest on the margin loan was part of the "fee" to the investment firm for devising the
transaction.
177. Compaq, 277 F.3d at 780; IES, 253 F.3d at 352.
178. Compaq, 277 F.3d at 780; IES, 253 F.3d at 352-53.
179. Compaq, 277 F.3d at 780; IES, 253 F.3d at 353.
180. Compaq, 277 F.3d at 780; IES, 253 F.3d at 353.
181. Compaq, 277 F.3d at 780; IES, 253 F.3d at 353.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2006

31

FLORIDA
Florida Law Review,
Vol.LAW
58,REVIEW
Iss. 3 [2006], Art. 4

[Vol. 58

from tax consequences.182
The Courts of Appeals, in both IES and Compaq, found that the lower
courts erred in finding that the economic substance doctrine precluded the
companies from obtaining the benefit of the foreign tax credit. 83 The
appeals courts stated that it was erroneous for the lower courts to conduct
the analysis of whether there was a potential for profit on the transactions
without considering the gross amount of the dividend received and
ignoring the foreign tax paid on it.'" What the courts failed to consider,
however, is that the financial markets had already taken the tax into
consideration when it determined the price the companies would have to
pay to buy the stock before the ex-dividend point.' 85 Because of the
efficiency of the financial markets, there are no arbitrage opportunities
created by the tax
with regard to ex-dividend dates except for opportunities
86
code and different status given to different entities.
The appellate courts in IES and Compaq reached the correct result, but
for the wrong reason. If the economic substance doctrine was an
appropriate inquiry for courts to engage in to reverse the clear language of
the tax code, then it definitely should be applicable to the transactions in
IES and Compaq. But it is not the role of the courts to determine when the
foreign tax credit should apply; it is the role of the courts to determine if
the foreign tax credit applies under the rules enacted by Congress. If a
provision of law is being used by taxpayers in a way Congress believes is
inappropriate, it is the responsibility of Congress to enact rules to prevent
the inappropriate use of the law. After this type of transaction came to
light, Congress acted and implemented § 901(k) of the Internal Revenue
Code to restrict the ability of taxpayers to use, as a foreign tax credit, taxes
paid on foreign dividend income on stock investments that have not been

182. IES Indus. v. United States, No. C97-206, 1999 WL 973538, at *2 (N.D. Iowa Sept. 22,
1999); Compaq Computer Corp. v. Conmm'r, 113 T.C. 214, 214 (T.C. 1999).
183. Compaq, 277 F.3d at 784-85; IES, 253 F.3d at 354.
184. Compaq, 277 F.3d at 784-85; IES, 253 F.3d at 354.
185. A better way of looking at the transactions to determine whether there was any economic
substance would be to look at the cash flows from the transaction. It would appear that aside from
the U.S. tax effects, the only cash inflow would be the after-tax value of the dividend, and the cash
outflows would include the after-tax value of the dividend (the loss on buy/sell transaction) and
transaction costs.
186. The entities from whom the U.S. companies bought the foreign stocks were foreign
entities that would have had to pay the same tax on the dividend as the U.S. companies had to pay.
The foreign entities, however, would not have obtained any benefit by paying the tax as the U.S.
companies did with the foreign tax credit. Therefore, the foreign entities were indifferent to having
the U.S. companies pay their taxes and give them the after-tax value of the dividend they would
have received in the form of gain on the transaction. Plus, the foreign entities probably got a little
extra compensation for assisting with the transaction and to offset any possible tax cost of realizing
a gain on the transactions.
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held for certain minimum holding periods. 187 It is absurd to think the tax
law meant the same thing before and after the enactment of § 901(k).
In the IES and Compaq cases, the taxpayers certainly got away with
"put[ting] one over on the Commissioner."' 8 8 In fact, they were also able
to put one over on panels each comprised of three circuit court judges. But
as Judge McKee noted in his dissent in ACM, it is the role of Congress and
the Treasury, not the courts, to address shortcomings in the tax law.'89
Surprisingly enough, in this instance, Congress acted and enacted §901 (k)
to prevent taxpayers from obtaining an improper tax benefit that was
created by a shortcoming in the tax law.
B. United Parcel Service v. Commissioner'9"
It generally would not be a prudent business strategy for a company to
voluntarily give away a profitable segment of its business for nothing. If,
however, the company or its owners could be assured of getting back
substantially all of the profits that it has given away and avoid tax on the
profits at the same time, then it seems like a fairly good idea. The factual
situation in the UPS case is, while slightly more complicated, practically
identical to this standard.
UPS is a well-known shipping company that engages in package
delivery services worldwide. 191 UPS has a policy that if a package is lost
in transit, UPS reimburses customers for the value of the package, but only
up to an amount of $100.19 If customers want their shipments insured for
an amount in excess of $100, then the customer is required to pay an extra

187. See Hariton, supra note 30, at 272-73. Hariton, a supporter of the economic substance
doctrine, argues that he is "not sure [that] Compaq is getting away with enough in this transaction
for a court to disallow the results for lack of economic substance." Id. I.R.C. § 901 (k)(1)(A) (2005)
provides:
In no event shall a credit be allowed under subsection (a) for any withholding tax
on a dividend with respect to stock in a corporation if(i) such stock is held by the recipient of the dividend for 15 days or less during
the 31-day period beginning on the date which is 15 days before the date on which
such share becomes ex-dividend with respect to such dividend, or
(ii) to the extent that the recipient of the dividend is under an obligation
(whether pursuant to a short sale or otherwise) to make related payments with
respect to positions in substantially similar or related property.
Id.
188. See supra notes 126, 129 and accompanying text.
189. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
190. 254 F.3d 1014 (llth Cir. 2001).
191. Id. at 1016.
192.byId.UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2006
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charge based on the declared value of the package.'93 Since UPS faced
additional exposure in these excess-value packages, it took special efforts
to "safeguard and track" the excess-value shipments.194 As a result of these
extra measures, the amounts it received from these 'excess-value charges'
far exceeded the amounts it was required to pay on claims for lost
packages where customers had purchased the excess coverage. 95
For a number of years, UPS reported the amount received as excessvalue charges as revenue and claimed deductions for the expenses of
paying out claims.' 96 Then, one of the company's insurance brokers
suggested that it could avoid paying taxes on the profits from this segment
of its business if UPS (presumably through him) restructured its "excessvalue" business as "insurance provided by an overseas affiliate.' ' 97 UPS
created a subsidiary in Bermuda and distributed the shares of the
subsidiary to its shareholders in a taxable dividend.198 UPS then purchased
an insurance policy for the benefit of its customers from a domestic
insurance company.' 99 The domestic insurance company then entered into
a reinsurance contract with the former subsidiary of UPS.2°°
UPS continued to administer the program, collect the charges, and pay
the claims. 20' The only difference was that UPS would remit the portion of
the charges not paid out as claims to the domestic insurance company
which would then, after taking a small percentage for facilitating the
transaction, remit the balance to the Bermuda entity on the reinsurance
policy. 2 2 For tax purposes, UPS didn't report the revenue it collected or
deduct the payments it made to settle claims. 2 3 The IRS assessed a
deficiency by claiming that the excess value charges were properly
includable in the gross income of UPS. 2' UPS challenged the deficiency

193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. At the time of these actions, UPS was not a publicly traded company and most
shareholders were employees of the company. Id. Also, it is likely that the Bermuda subsidiary did
not require a large amount of capital since it served no purpose other than to receive income, and
therefore the taxable status of the distribution to the shareholders was insignificant. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. Although the case opinion does not mention it, it is likely that the domestic insurance
company had a contractual obligation to enter the reinsurance contract with the former UPS
subsidiary. Without such an obligation, the insurance company could have kept the profits with
virtually no risk on the insurance contract.
201. Id. at 1016-17.
202. Id. at 1017.
203. Id. UPS did, however, deduct the fees and commissions it paid to the domestic insurance
company. Id.
204. Id.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol58/iss3/4
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in the Tax Court, but the Tax Court upheld the IRS determination.2 5 The
Eleventh Circuit, noting that it was not clear whether the Tax Court
applied the assignment of income doctrine or the economic substance
doctrine, the assignment of income doctrine's "kissing cousin," reversed
the Tax Court and held that the transaction had enough economic
substance to be recognized for tax purposes.2"
The opinion noted that for purposes of applying the economic
substance doctrine in the Eleventh Circuit, the only factor to consider is
whether the transactions had any real economic effects.2 7 The court found
that despite the long-standing profitability of the excess-value business,
UPS transferred and the domestic insurance company accepted some risk
of loss (even if that risk was miniscule) associated with insuring excessvalue shipments.20 8 The court further stated that it was irrelevant that the
domestic insurance company reinsured the policy with the Bermuda
company that was created by UPS and distributed to UPS shareholders. 2°
Judge Ryskamp dissented and stated that the Tax Court had sufficient
grounds to conclude that the transaction lacked economic substance.210
Of all the cases discussed in this Note, UPS is probably the one that
comes closest to the line where the corporate taxpayer should be able to
obtain the tax treatment it desired. Perhaps this is because the transaction
at issue did not involve any of the complicated non-recognition or arbitrary
basis rules from the Code or Regulations. The transaction involved no
more than the application of basic income tax principles concerning the
recognition of income and the deductibility of expenses. In both the Tax
Court and the Eleventh Circuit, the Government argued that the result
UPS sought should not be allowed because the lack of economic
substance to the transactions justified courts in disallowing the result
that would apply from an objective application of the law.2 1 The
205. Id.; United Parcel Serv. v. Comm'r, 78 T.C.M. 262 (RIA 1999) (providing a calculation
of deficiency determination).
206. UPS, 254 F.3d at 1016-17.
207. Id. at 1017 (citing Kirchman v. Comm'r, 862 F.2d 1486, 1490 (11th Cir. 1989)). The
court stated that the Eleventh Circuit standard varied in that it did not accept the typical two-part
test for economic substance that required both a determination that the transaction lacked economic
substance and had a tax-avoidance purpose. Id. at 1018 n.2 (comparing the standard used in many
circuits with Rice's Toyota World, Inc. v. Comm'r, 752 F.2d 89, 91-92 (4th Cir. 1985)).
208. UPS, 254 F.3d at 1018-19.
209. Id. at 1019 ("But even if we overlook the reality of the risk and treat National Union as
a conduit for transmission of the excess-value payments from UPS to OPL, there remains the fact
that OPL is an independently taxable entity that is not under UPS's control. UPS really did lose the
stream of income it had earlier reaped from excess-value charges.").
210. Id. at 1020-22 (Ryskamp, J., dissenting) ("In sum, UPS failed to show any legitimate
business reason for giving up nearly $100 million in EVC income in 1984.").
211. For a discussion of the facts of the transaction, see supranotes 194-99 and accompanying
text.
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IRS should have argued that a correct application of the tax code, as
written by Congress and interpretedby the courts, required UPS to include
the amount collected as excess-value charges in its gross income.
UPS involved nothing more than a question concerning assignment of
income 12 and potentially (depending on how the assignment of income
question was answered) whether the expense of buying the insurance
policy from the domestic insurance company was deductible as an
ordinary and necessary business expense.213 Section 61 includes as income
everything that Congress is empowered to tax under the Sixteenth
Amendment.214 For any given tax year, 1 5 gross income includes all
"undeniable accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the
taxpayers have complete dominion. ' '216 Courts developed the assignment
of income doctrine to prevent taxpayers from avoiding tax liability by
shifting income they had earned to another party in order to circumvent the
realization component of Glenshaw Glass.217 The basic principle of the

212. I.R.C. § 61(a) (2004) includes in gross income all income from whatever source derived
unless a specific Code provision excludes it.
213. I.R.C. § 162(a) (2004) allows as a deduction "all the ordinary and necessary expenses
paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business."
214. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. Prior to adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment Congress only
had the power to impose taxes based on population. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
215. In addition to determining what constitutes income for tax purposes, a decision had to be
made about adopting either an annual or transactional accounting system for determining and
reporting taxes. See STEVEN J. WL.IS, ERROR CORRECTION, ACCOUNTING, AND THE TIME VALUE
OF MONEY (CD-ROM, 2001). Congress chose to enact an annual system of accounting in lieu of
a transactional system. See I.R.C. §§ 441,451, 461 (2005).
216. Comm'r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955). Under Glenshaw Glass, all
realized accessions to wealth (unless excluded by Congress) are included in gross income. Id. at
429. Congress has allowed certain items to be deducted from gross income in arriving at the income
that is taxed. See I.R.C. § § 162, 165, 212 (2004). With many deductions (particularly those allowed
under § 212), however, there are significant impediments to obtaining the benefit of those
deductions. See I.R.C. §§ 63, 67 (2000) (limiting deductions under § 212 as itemized deductions
and allowing deductions only to the extent that the aggregate exceeds 2% of adjusted gross
income). The deductions allowed under § 212 are also subject to being disallowed in computing
a taxpayer's alternative minimum tax. See I.R.C. §§ 55-58 (2003). Furthermore, the Court has held
that deductions depend "upon legislative grace" and therefore to be allowed to deduct an expense,
a taxpayer must be able to "point to an applicable statute and show that he comes within its terms."
New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435,440 (1934); see alsoDeputy v. du Pont, 308 U.S.
488, 493 (1940) (stating that "allowance of deductions ... does not turn on general equitable
considerations").
217. See Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 115 (1930) (holding that the income belongs to the
person who earns it and the fruits of one's labor cannot be "attributed to a different tree from that
on which they grew"). In Lucas, a husband entered into a contract with his wife agreeing that any
property either may have acquired (including earnings from salaries) would be treated and
considered as property owned in joint tenancy. Id. at 113-14. The Court held that the entirety of the
husband's salary and earnings should be taxed as his income and stated that the absence of any
motive to reduce taxes was irrelevant. Id. at 114-15; see also Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 114,
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assignment of income doctrine is that income is taxed to the taxpayer who
earned the income even if the right to receive the income never vests in the
earner because the earner assigned that right to another before the
transaction was complete. Although typically applied to assignments of
income within families to prevent a high-bracket taxpayer shifting income
to a low-bracket taxpayer,2"8 the assignment of income doctrine is simply
an interpretation of § 61 that includes all income in gross income.2" 9
If the issue in UPS had been framed as an issue of assignment of
income, it is likely that a court, properly applying the doctrine, would find
that UPS was the taxpayer that earned the revenue and therefore even the
pre-arranged insurance contract could not prevent UPS from being
required to recognize the income. The only way a court could find that the
income should not be taxed to UPS would be to hold that UPS was merely
acting as the agent for the insurance company.22° Since UPS continued to
operate the business the same way-collecting the funds and remitting
only the amount remaining after the claims had been paid to the insurance
company, and did not hold itself out to be acting as an agent for the
insurance company-it is unlikely a court would find a true agency
relationship.
If a court concluded that the assignment of income doctrine required
that UPS include the amount received as gross income, the court would
then have to decide whether UPS was allowed to deduct the amount it paid
to the insurance company as an ordinary and necessary business
expense.' UPS had paid out all of its profits on a segment of its business
to insure a risk that they had effectively mitigated through efficient
business processes.222 Whether such an expense was "ordinary and
necessary" would depend on the court's analysis of the facts. As Justice
Cardozo pointed out about the deduction for ordinary and necessary
business expenses: "One struggles in vain for any verbal formula that will
120 (1940) (holding that a father earned interest income even though he gave bond coupons to his
son because the father retained ownership of the bond).
218. Lucas and Horst both involved cases where the income was diverted from one family
member to another in a gratuitous transfer. By contrast, in the case of a contingency fee, the
transaction is a result ofan arm's length commercial transaction with a legitimate business purpose.
219. The assignment of income doctrine has also been applied to many nonfamily situations.
See. e.g., Comm'r v. Banks, 125 S. Ct. 826, 828-29 (2005) (holding that a client who received
money from a settlement of a lawsuit in which the client's attorney retained a portion of the
settlement as a contingent fee had to include the entire amount of the settlement in gross income
even if the deduction for attorney's fees was disallowed by application of the alternative minimum
tax).
220. See Comm'r v. Bollinger, 485 U.S. 340,340-41 (1988); Nat'l Carbide Corp. v. Comm'r,
336 U.S. 422, 437 (1949) (stating the factors that are used to determine whether a true corporate
agency relationship exists for tax purposes).
221. See supra notes 190-95 and accompanying text.
222. See supra note 206.
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supply a ready touchstone. The standard set up by the statute is not a rule
of law; it is rather a way of life. Life in all its fullness must supply the
answer to the riddle. 223
The UPS case demonstrates that given the factual circumstances of the
tax shelter UPS attempted to implement, economic substance was highly
relevant because substance is relevant to the interpretationof §§ 61 and
162. However, the economic substance doctrine, which affords courts the
subjective power to disregard the results when the court believes the
results are improper, was not an appropriate analysis of the case. As stated
above, UPS comes extremely close to the line between clever tax planning
that works and too clever planning under a vague provision of a statute
that fails. But regardless of what side of the line the court decides the
transaction belongs, the proper analysis follows an application of §§ 61
and 162, not the economic substance doctrine.
VI. THE IRS FLIPS OUT OVER FLIPS
As can be seen from a comparison of the cases in the previous two
sections, the decisions of the various courts in cases involving the
application of the economic substance doctrine and other provisions of the
tax law to corporate tax shelters are inconsistent. 224 A large part of that
inconsistency can be attributed to the subjectivity needed to employ the
doctrine. Nevertheless, the inconsistent decisions create difficulties for
professionals trying to plan transactions for clients and create the
opportunity for a discussion of a certain type of tax shelter before any
court has rendered a decision on the merits of the plan.
A recent investigation by the IRS revealed that the Big Four accounting
firms were all engaged in selling similar highly aggressive tax shelters to
wealthy individuals to create capital losses to offset large capital gains
generally realized from selling closely-held businesses.225 In September
2005, the IRS announced that it had reached a settlement with KPMG in
which KPMG agreed to pay a $456 million fine to avoid criminal
prosecution of the firm. 226 Although no court has ever ruled that the

223. Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933).
224. The Tax Court has been fairly consistent in applying the doctrine to disallow the tax
shelter results. The Courts of Appeals, however, have been highly inconsistent as illustrated in Parts
IV and V, supra.
225. Calvin H. Johnson, Tales From The KPMG Skunk Works: The Basis-Shift OrDefectiveRedemption Shelter, 108 TAX NOTES 431, 431 (2005). See generally SENATE PERMANENT
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. AND GOVERNMENTAL
AFFAIRs, THE ROLE OF PROFESSIONAL FIRMS IN THE U.S. TAX SHELTER INDusTRY, S. REP. No. 109-54

(2005) (describing the role of public accounting firms in marketing tax shelters).
226. News Release, Internal Revenue Serv., KPMG to Pay $456 Million for Criminal
Violations (Aug. 29, 2005), availableat http://www.irs.gov/newsrooml/article/O,,id=146999,00.html. In 38
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transaction fails to qualify for the tax treatment KPMG "sold" to clients,
the IRS has aggressively challenged the transactions.227
KPMG and the other major accounting firms sold shelters based on
similar provisions of the tax law and similar transactions under various
acronyms.228 One of KPMG's shelters was called FLIP, for Foreign
Leveraged Investment Program (FLIPS).22 ' The purpose of the FLIPS
shelter was to create capital losses for taxpayers who had capital gains that
they "needed" to offset.23° Under FLIPS, KPMG would create an entity in
the Cayman Islands that was not subject to any taxation. 231 The entity
would then engage in a transaction where the entity borrowed the amount
of the desired loss on a nonrecourse basis from a foreign bank and then
bought shares of stock in the same foreign bank with the proceeds.232 The
Cayman Islands entity received a cost basis of the full value of the stock.23 3
The U.S. taxpayer who bought the shelter would buy a small number of
shares in the foreign bank and acquire out-of-the-money options to buy a
majority interest in the Cayman Islands entity.234 Then a few months later
the bank would redeem all of the stock of the Cayman entity and
simultaneously the U.S. taxpayer would purchase from the foreign bank
out-of-the-money options on the exact number of shares that the Cayman
entity had owned and redeemed.235
The goal of all of those transactions was to have the redemption of

that same news release, the IRS announced that it would pursue criminal conspiracy and tax fraud
charges against nine individuals, including many former partners at KPMG, a tax lawyer involved
in providing opinion letters to the taxpayers involved in the transactions, and investment bankers
that orchestrated the transactions. Id.
227. Professor Calvin H. Johnson of the University of Texas School of Law has written that
the fact that over 80% of taxpayers that bought KPMG's or similar tax shelters have settled with
the IRS on not very favorable terms indicates that it is unlikely the purported results of the shelters
are legitimate. Johnson, supra note 225, at 441-42. It is important to note that Professor Johnson
is serving as an expert witness for taxpayers who bought the shelter in lawsuits against KPMG. Id.
at 431.
228. Id. at 433.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 434.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 434-35. In reality the money never left the bank, but the shares were actually issued
and the debt recorded on the bank's books. The IRS, however, did not contend that the transaction
never took place, only that it either did not or should not generate the tax benefits claimed by
KPMG and the U.S. taxpayers. Id. The Cayman Islands entity received a cost basis of the full value
of the stock. Id.
233. Id. at 435.
234. Johnson, supranote 225, at 434. The U.S. taxpayer acquiring the options on the Cayman
entity served two purposes. First it established a connection between the U.S. taxpayer and the
Cayman entity, which was necessary for the plan to work. Second, it served as a way for the U.S.
taxpayer to pay KPMG the fee for its shelter. See id.
235. Id. at 435.
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shares by the foreign bank fail to qualify as a redemption under § 302(b)
of the Code.2 36 If the redemption failed to qualify as a redemption under
§ 302(b), then § 302(d) required that the distribution of property (which
would be equal to the full amount of the nonrecourse loan) be treated
under § 301 as a dividend instead of a sale or exchange.237 The argument
in support of the shelter is that the options purchased by the U.S. taxpayer
were treated the same as actual shares by § 318(a)(4), and under
§ 318(a)(3) the shares attributed to the U.S. taxpayer are re-attributed to
the Cayman entity because of the U.S. taxpayer's ownership of options in
the Cayman entity.238 Since the options in the foreign bank and the
redemption of the Cayman entity's shares occurred simultaneously, both
before and after the redemption, the Cayman entity had no reduction at all,
let alone a "meaningful reduction, 239 in its proportionate interest of the
company. 24° Therefore, according to the shelter, the distribution was
"essentially equivalent to a dividend" and did not meet any mathematical
standard of § 302(b).24
236. Id. at 434-35. I.R.C. § 302(b) (2005) provides that a distribution from a corporation to
a shareholder will only receive sale or exchange treatment as a redemption if one of the following
four conditions is met:
(1) Redemptions not equivalent to dividends.-Subsection (a) shall apply if the
redemption is not essentially equivalent to a dividend.
(2) Substantially disproportionate redemption of stock.(A) In general.-Subsection (a) shall apply if the distribution is substantially
disproportionate with respect to the shareholder.
(3) Termination of shareholder's interest.-Subsection (a) shall apply if the
redemption is in complete redemption of all of the stock ofthe corporation owned
by the shareholder.
(4)...
Id.
237. I.R.C. § 302(b) (2005); I.R.C. §§ 302(d), 301 (2005); Johnson, supranote 225, at434-35.
238. Johnson, supra note 225, at 435-36.
239. United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301, 313 (1970).
240. Johnson, supra note 225, at 435.
241. Id. In his article, Professor Johnson argues that the transaction whereby the U.S. taxpayer
acquires the options that are attributed to the Cayman entity is not what is meant by retaining the
same proportion before and after the transaction in Davis. Id. at 436. Johnson argues that what is
relevant is what he calls "recapture," whether the interest stays the same after the redemption by
virtue of the remaining shares the taxpayer owned before the redemption and continued to own after
the redemption. For example, a taxpayer who owns all 100 shares of a corporation continues to own
100% after the redemption of eighty of his shares. On the other hand, a taxpayer who owned 1,000
out of 10,000 of outstanding shares, has a meaningful reduction in his interest when he redeems 500
of his shares because his interest drops from 10% (1,000/10,000) to 5.26% (500/9,500) (that
example would also qualify as a redemption under 302(b)(2)). Id. at 436-37. Although not clear in
Davis, Professor Johnson is likely correct in his analysis of the "not essentially equivalent to a 40
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If the redemption was to be treated as a dividend, the Cayman entity
would have to recognize dividend income for the full amount, but it would
not affect the entity at all because the Cayman entity was not subject to
any income tax.242 Since the distribution was not treated as a redemption
under § 302, the Cayman entity's basis in the stock that it no longer owned
was not used to offset amounts received in the distribution.243 The FLIPS
shelter worked on the idea that the Cayman entity's unused basis in the
stock migrated from the Cayman Islands over the Caribbean Sea and into
the basis of the U.S. taxpayer's small number of shares of the foreign
bank. 2 "
Professor Johnson attacks the FLIPS shelter on a number of technical
and economic substance grounds. Even without considering the economic
substance doctrine, the transactions in question don't generate the claimed
result. 245 The main technical problem with the shelter was that it relied on

dividend" test set forth in Davis. But the fact that Davis described one situation where the
distribution was not essentially equivalent to a dividend does not mean that is the only situation
where a distribution is not essentially equivalent to a dividend. For instance, the technical problem
Professor Johnson found could be "fixed" by the U.S. taxpayer buying an extraordinarily large
number of out-of-the-money worthless options on stock of the foreign bank long before the Cayman
entity was redeemed and that would get it past the Davis recapture rule. The fact that the transaction
may meet any mathematical test is irrelevant when the Code provision provides an economic
substance-based standard. "Not essentially equivalent to a dividend," see supranote 236, is a vague
standard that requires a court to examine whether the transaction is essentially equivalent to a
dividend. It is likely not a good idea to base a tax shelter on a subjective provision of the law.
242. Johnson, supra note 225, at 435-36.
243. Id. at 436.
244. Id. See Treas. Reg. § 1.302-2(c) (1997) ("In any case in which an amount received in
redemption of stock is treated as a distribution of a dividend, proper adjustment of the basis of the
remaining stock will be made with respect to the stock redeemed ....Example (2). H and W,
husband and wife, each own half of the stock of Corporation X. All of the stock was purchased by
H for $100,000 cash. In 1950 H gave one-half of the stock to W, the stock transferred having a
value in excess of $50,000. In 1955 all of the stock of H is redeemed for $150,000, and it is
determined that the distribution to H in redemption of his shares constitutes the distribution of a
dividend. Immediately after the transaction, W holds the remaining stock of Corporation X with
a basis of $100,000."). Partly as a result of these types of transactions, the Treasury has issued
proposed regulations that would replace the basis-shifting regulations and require that the taxpayer
retain the basis as a separate item to be deducted at a later date. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.302-5,
67 Fed. Reg. 64331 (Oct. 18, 2002).
245. One of KPMG's problems could stem from the fact that the KPMG tax partners who
devised and sold FLIPS did not even believe the claims were legitimate. Johnson, supra note 225,
at 432. Johnson noted one piece of evidence that came to light at Senate hearings on the tax shelter
industry was the following exchange of emails between two KPMG partners:
Partner 1: I do believe the time has come to s**t and get off the pot. The business
decisions to me are primarily two: (1) Have we drafted the opinion with the
appropriate limiting bells and whistles ...and (2) Are we being paid enough to
offset the risks of potential litigation resulting from the transaction? My own
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vague, economic substance-based code provisions to generate the desired
results. As Professor Johnson noted in his article, the regulation that FLIPS
relied on to transfer the basis to the U.S. taxpayer stated that "proper
adjustment" should be made to the basis of other stock. But even assuming
that KPMG's interpretation of the basis-shifting regulation was correct, the
first link in the chain failed. Despite the Supreme Court's holding in Davis
(which involved completely different factual circumstances), no
reasonable person would conclude that the transactions between the
foreign bank and the Cayman entity were "essentially equivalent to a
dividend." Since § 302(b)(1) uses vague and subjective language, there is
no bright-line rule (such as the ratable basis recovery rule in ACM) to
manipulate. When the statute uses vague language, there is no need for an
economic substance doctrine because applying the statute as written
requires courts to look at the substance of the transaction and to consider
26
that "[life] in all its fullness must supply the answer to the riddle."
It is hard to say whether the criminal penalties sought by the
government in the KPMG case are appropriate.247 While the transaction
seems laughable,24 there was legal precedent from the United States
Supreme Court and Treasury regulations that arguably supports the
position taken by KPMG.2 49 It certainly appears clear that KPMG did not

recommendation is that we should be paid a lot of money here for our opinion
since the transaction is clearly one that the IRS would view as falling squarely
within the tax shelter orbit.
Partner 2: 1 think [the expression is] s**t OR get off the pot. I vote for s**t.
Id.
246. Welch v. Helvering, 209 U.S. 111, 115 (1933).
247. See Press Release, United States Attorney S. Dist. of N.Y., Nineteen Individuals Charged
In Superseding Indictment Filed In Criminal Tax Case Related To KPMG Tax Shelters (Oct. 17,
2005), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/nyslPress%20Releases/October%2005/
KPMG%20Superseding%2OIndictment%20PR.pdf#search='United%20States%20%26%2Jeff
rey%20Stein%20%26%20indictment'. But see Robert Weisberg & David Mills, A Very Strange
Indictment, WALL ST. J., Oct. 12, 2005, at A16. Even if the KPMG partners who marketed the
shelter to clients knew that the claimed results were highly dubious, that alone is not sufficient to
create criminal liability. Id. Additionally, it appears as though the prosecutors were unusually
aggressive in pursuing the criminal case before any court had ever ruled on the merits of the
underlying transaction. Jonathan Weil, Nine Are Chargedin KPMG Case on Tax Shelters, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 30, 2005, at Cl; Editorial, KPMG in Wonderland, WALL ST. J., Oct. 6, 2005, at A14
(commenting that the government's aggressive use of criminal prosecutions against KPMG partners
before litigating the merits of the transactions may be the result of "several recent IRS setbacks"
in court).
248. But in reality many distinctions in tax law are laughable. For example, between 2001 and
2004, a taxpayer could deduct the full $65,000 cost of a Cadillac Escalade used in his business
because it weighed over 6,000 pounds, but the taxpayer that used a $20,000 Chevy Malibu was
severely limited in his depreciation deductions. I.R.C. §§ 179, 280F (2004).
249. See United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301, 313 (1970); Treas. Reg. § 1.302-2(c) (1997).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol58/iss3/4

42

Glassman: "It'sTAX
Not
a Lie ifAND
YouTHE
Believe
It": Tax
Shelters
and the Economic
SHELTERS
ECONOMIC
SUBSTANCE
DOCTRINE

even feel that the transaction had a reasonable chance of success if
challenged and therefore it is clear that civil tax penalties are
appropriate. °
VII. THE SKY is NOT FALLING AND IF IT WERE FALLING, THE
ECONOMIC SUBSTANCE DOCTRINE WOULDN'T SAVE US!

Regardless of whether criminal tax charges are warranted against the
individuals who developed and marketed FLIPS, the fact that it occurred
was the result of the failure of control within a few organizations and
improper actions by a few individuals. It was not a failure of the law as
written. The FLIPS shelter (if ever litigated) would fail because the result
sought by KPMG only would occur if someone disregarded a couple of
subsections of the tax code and removed some words from the regulations;
it wouldn't fail because a judge would decide to disregard the law under
the economic substance doctrine. When there is a string of bank robberies
or murders in a community, there isn't a rush to enact new laws against
bank robbery and murder. It seems, however, that whenever there is any
white-collar criminal activity that attracts public attention, the most
immediate reaction is to push251
for new laws to prohibit the type of behavior
law.
the
violates
already
that
The attention given to cases of high-profile corporate tax shelters has
created the same type of push.252 Many commentators and politicians view
codification of the economic substance doctrine as an integral part of
winning the "war" on tax shelters. Some commentators, most tax
professional organizations from both the legal and accounting professions,
and, notably, the United States Treasury Department oppose codification
of the doctrine.253 Some alternatives to codification of the economic

250. Johnson, supranote 225, at 440-42.
251. After Enron and other well-known corporate scandals, Congress rushed to pass the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. While some of the reforms in Sarbanes-Oxley may be excellent ideas, Enron
and the other scandals did not occur because the corporate laws in this country were inadequate.
Those scandals occurred because a few individuals decided to break the rules for their own personal
benefit. While the new law may make it more challenging to commit corporate fraud, it is only a
matter of time before we have the next round of corporate scandals.
252. But how has the current law failed? In each case discussed in this Note, the government
learned of the transaction and had the opportunity to litigate the issues in court. The law worked
exactly as it should have worked. And even though the decisions by some courts may be
questionable and there can be differing views on the degree to which courts should follow the literal
language in the tax code and Regulations, the system of required disclosures allows the IRS to
challenge questionable transactions and initiate amendments to the Regulations or propose Code
changes to Congress to prevent future use of the "loopholes" with which the IRS disagrees.
253. Sheryl Stratton, Officials Gauge Government Success In War On Shelters, 106 TAX
NOTES 883 (2005). See also Donald L. Korb, Korb Gives Speech on EconomicSubstance Doctrine,
TAX NOTES TODAY, Jan. 25, 2005, at 16. Although Korb stated that the economic substance
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substance doctrine include increasing disclosure requirements, increasing
civil penalties for misstatements, and the always popular, but not going to
happen in a million years, meaningful tax reform.
In reality, the only thing that codification of the economic substance
doctrine would do is mute the criticisms of strict constructionists, such as
myself. Such a codification that expressly made economic substance a part
of every provision of the Code would refute any argument that the
decisions changing the results from tax shelter transactions were the result
of activist judges disregarding the statute.254 But even though such a
codification would legitimize judicial use of the doctrine, it would
represent an abdication of Congress's responsibility to create a tax law that
fairly distributes the tax burden among the taxpayers.255 If the tax law
improperly favors corporations, then it is the role of the political process
through the election of members of Congress to mandate that change. It is
improper for the people who enact the laws to attempt to pass
responsibility onto the businesses and tax advisors who plan around the
rules written by Congress. If Congress writes a bad law, members of
Congress should be the ones to fix what was bad in the law they wrote.
While slightly different economic substance standards have developed
between the various circuits, all the circuits have adopted the doctrine and
apply it to corporate transactions.2 6 Commentators object to the results in
cases such as Compaq, IES, and UPS because the courts found economic
substance where the commentators thought the courts should not, not
because the courts did not apply the economic substance doctrine. Those
who argue against those decisions simply disagree with the subjective
determination of the courts that the transactions had economic substance
apart from the tax effects. Codification of the doctrine would not force
courts to find a lack of economic substance to the Compaq, IES, and UPS
doctrine plays an "important role" in the tax system and should be available for the IRS to use as
an argument in tax shelter cases, he opposed codification and its use as a "general anti-abuse"
measure and indicated that when the government has technical grounds to challenge a transaction,
the use of economic substance as an argument should only be as a secondary or tertiary argument.
See id.
254. It would be an interesting argument if application of such a provision, what I refer to as
the "heads the government wins, tails the taxpayer loses" law, would survive a constitutional
challenge on grounds that such a subjective law denies taxpayers proper notice of the tax law in a
manner that deprives the taxpayer of due process. For a discussion of cases involving gift-leaseback
transactions, see Karen Nelson Moore, The Sham Transaction Doctrine: An Outmoded And
UnnecessaryApproach To Combating Tax Avoidance, 41 FLA. L. REV. 659, 703-07 (1989).
255. See Kenseth v. Comm'r, 259 F.3d 881 (7th Cir. 2001) (exploring that fairness and equity
in the tax law are the responsibility of Congress).
256. Compare Rice's Toyota World, Inc. v. Comm'r, 752 F.2d 89, 91-92 (4th Cir. 1985)
(requiring tax avoidance purpose in addition to lack of economic substance), with Kirchman v.
Comm'r, 862 F.2d 1486, 1492 (1 1th Cir. 1989) (refusing to consider subjective intent when
transaction lacks economic effect).
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transactions unless the law went further than the current judicially-applied
doctrine and refused to give effect to a whole range of tax planning
transactions.257 To most in the tax world, however, planning transactions
to minimize taxes is a legitimate activity. 2 8
The conclusion that tax planning and structuring transactions to take
advantage of provisions of the tax law is a legitimate activity does not
mean that there is not any downside to a system that allows such planning.
The backbone of our system of taxation is the idea of self-reporting of
income for both individuals and corporations. An extremely strong
argument for preventing corporate tax loopholes is that the ability of
certain taxpayers to reap improper tax benefits by cleverly exploiting
technical provisions of the tax code creates a lack of respect for the system
and a willingness to cheat among the rest of the taxpayers who are not in
a position to garner the same benefit of tax planning. 259 But that is a reason
to make the law better, not to enact a catchall override that prevents
taxpayers from making decisions based on the rules as written.
Most everyone agrees that it is infeasible and unwise to have a tax
system based solely on bright-line rules. 2 ° Most also agree that it is
unwise to have a system based solely on subjective determinations.

257. For an argument in favor of outlawing a range of tax planning strategies because such
activities produce external costs that are borne by society and not the individuals who engage in
the planning, see David A. Weisbach, The Failureof Disclosure as an Approach to Shelters, 54
SMU L. REV. 73, 80 (2001).
258. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
259. See Steven J. Willis, Masks, Magic, And Games. The Use of Tax Law as a Policy Tool,
4 AM. J. TAx PoL'Y 41 (1985). One of the types of transactions that Professor Willis argues breeds
that type of contempt for the system, as well as the belief that the tax law can be easily
manipulated, is the gift-leaseback transaction. See id. at 65-70. In such a situation a taxpayer who
owns a piece of fully depreciated property initially gives the property to a person to whom the
taxpayer wishes to divert income and then immediately leases the property back. See id. Although
the formalities for such a transaction vary from circuit to circuit, it is generally a way to allow
taxpayers to shift income from a high-bracket taxpayer to a low-bracket taxpayer. Willis argues that
taxpayers, upon hearing this advice from tax planners, think it is "magic" and that as a society, such
transactions breed contempt for the tax law. Id. The example Willis uses in his article involves a
dentist giving a piece of equipment to his child and leasing it back. Id. The objection to such a
transaction, however, is not that the transaction lacks economic substance because one could easily
design a situation where two dentists who are friends give each other's children identical pieces of
equipment and then the children lease it to the other dentist. Although that may require moving the
equipment from one office to another, those transactions would have to have economic substance
because the actual pieces of equipment used in each business have changed. The problem with such
a transaction is that the taxpayer is getting to take deductions on property which he has already fully
depreciated. See id.This is because taxpayers may dispose of depreciated property by gift without
being required to recapture excess depreciation under § 1245. See id. Such a transaction (or at least
the tax benefit of such a transaction) could be prevented by removing the exemption from recapture
for gifts.
260. Weisbach, supra note 257, at 79.
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Therefore, the system should have some mix of subjective, "life in all its
fullness" standards, and some concrete bright-line rules. This Note was not
designed to state how to determine the appropriate balance, but it is
interesting to note that many of the bright-line rules were implemented to
prevent subjective abuse of the system. What I have set out to demonstrate
is that when the results of application of the rule produce undesirable
results, the appropriate course of action is to change the rule for the future,
not disregard the rule in the present.
Some authors have made it seem like tax shelters and tax planning are
the greatest threats this country faces and that these transactions threaten
the ability of government to function.26' I think those doomsday concerns
are overstated. In this Note, I examined essentially five types of tax shelter
transactions: A CM, Longterm Capital,Compaq/IES, UPS, and FLIPS. Of
those five transactions, I believe only two, ACM and CompaqilES, would
have been allowed in a world without the economic substance doctrine.262
The results in ACM could have easily been changed for future transactions
by changing the ratable basis regulations, while Congress changed the
results from CompaqilES type transactions with the enactment of
§ 901(k). 263 UPS, although allowed by the Eleventh Circuit under the
economic substance doctrine, would not necessarily have been allowed
under traditional application of tax law principles. Finally, the results
sought by the taxpayers in Longterm Capitaland the FLIPS shelter would
be disallowed by clear application of the code sections in question. 26
VIII. CONCLUSION

I once saw a bumper sticker regarding the debate over school prayer
that said: "As Long as There Are Tests-There Will Be Prayer In Public
Schools." The same could be said about tax law. As long as there are
taxes, people will find ways to reduce their tax liability. With bright-line
rules, people plan transactions to exploit technical problems with the rules.
If instead of clear rules, the tax law were comprised of subjective
standards, people would attempt to characterize their activities in taxfavorable ways. Some argue that the best way to stop the transactions they
believe are inappropriate is to give the courts the equitable power to
disregard the law when the transaction smells bad. But just as justice is
blind, it also should have no olfactory sense. Corporations, like
261. See generally Weisbach, supra note 257 (referring to the "boom" in the tax shelter
industry and advocating a broad substantive disallowance rule involving tax motivated transactions
and financial products).
262. ACM was disallowed by the Third Circuit. See supra Part IV.A. Compaq/IES was
affirmed by the Fifth and Eight Circuits, respectively. See supra Part V.A.
263. See supra Parts IV.A, V.A.
264. See supra Parts IV.B, V.
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individuals, are entitled to rely on the law as drafted and plan their affairs
accordingly. Even though some people-for example, KPMG with
FLIPS-take the "it's not a lie if you believe it" theory of the truth too far
beyond what the law allows, those who design transactions that fall within
the technical provisions of the law are entitled to rely on the rules of the
game that existed at the start of the game. Taxpayers are not free to
characterize compensation as gifts to avoid tax or characterize an equity
investment as debt because of a better tax treatment, but when Congress
has seen fit, whether correctly or incorrectly, to create a clear,
unambiguous rule, the taxpayers should be able to rely on the notion that
the rule
will be honored. For too long courts have exercised various
"smell ' 265 tests to determine whether substance or form should control the
tax treatment of certain transactions. I hope we can progress to a system
where substance controls when the statute makes substance control, and
form controls when the statute makes form control.

265. See supra note 15.
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